Report: Walking the path to the next global financial crisis

Dr Bryce Wilkinson and Leonard Hong

Foreward by Victoria University Professor Arthur Grimes

New Zealand must prepare for the next global financial crisis

New Zealand’s economy suffered less damage from the pandemic than analysts expected.

But new research warns, however, that just as we are emerging from the COVID-19, a new crisis is already on the horizon.

Walking the path to the next global financial crisis highlights the danger of an economic crash which could see asset prices collapse, businesses fail, and KiwiSaver funds and investment portfolios destroyed. Recent homebuyers may find themselves owing more on their mortgage than their home is worth.

According to the report, governments’ and central banks’ responses to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 laid the groundwork for the next financial crisis.

With zero interest rates and money printing, asset prices have soared, consumer prices have risen, and public debt has reached dangerous levels globally.

The world’s politicians and central bank governors are now struggling to return to more normal policies. The result is an economically perilous future.

Former Reserve Bank of New Zealand chair Arthur Grimes warns in the foreword to the report there may be only a short time before the next financial crisis. “Central bank actions through the pandemic … have placed New Zealand at greater risk of an asset price collapse with ensuing economic pain; the risk is heightened by the unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies globally,” Grimes writes.

The Government must prepare for the next global financial crisis, even though New Zealand is too small to prevent it. The prudent course is to reduce debt, both public and private.

The Covid-19 financial support package has kept Kiwis off of the dole queue and saved many businesses from bankruptcy. However, the government should promptly repay those debts in order to be prepared for the next financial shock.

Failing to prepare now for the next financial crisis could destroy New Zealanders’ nest eggs and threaten their livelihoods.

보고서: 미래의 글로벌 금융위기에 대한 대응 방안 (원제: Walking the Path to the Next Global Financial Crisis)

브라이스 윌킨슨 ∙ 홍레오 공저

천사 (아서 그라임스 교수, 웰링턴 빅토리아대학교)

금융위기 임박?

이 보고서의 제목인 “글로벌 금융위기로 가는 길(Walking the Path to the Next Global Financial Crisis)”은 얼마나 가까운 미래에 금융위기가 발생할 것인지에 논란에 대한 질문을 던진다. 그리고 상당히 근미래에 글로벌 금융위기가 발생할 수 있는 이유가 있다고 본다.  

지난 25년간  뉴질랜드를 비롯한 많은 국가들은 아시아금융위기와 글로벌금융위기(GFC)라는 두 번의  전세계적인 위기의 영향을 받아 왔다. 이 두번의 금융위기는 부채 문제를 심각하게 받아들이지 않고 지속가능하지 않은 방법으로 무리한 확장을 해왔던 것이 그 원인이라고 할 수 있는데, 정부의 재정적자, 중앙은행의 안일한 통화정책, 그리고 민간금융기관의 무분별한 대출관행이 맞물려 이러한 위기를 초래했다.  

코로나19팬데믹으로 인한 위기 상황에 대해 금융기관이 취한 결정들은 앞서 발생한 두 금융위기를 초래한 문제들을 답습하고 있다. 각국 정부는 활발한 경제 활동과 경기부양을 위해 위해 돈 쏟아붓기를 감행하여 부채 후유증 가능성을 높이고 있고, 중앙은행 이러한 적자 보전을 위해 자금을 마련해주었으며, 민간기관은 그로 인한 유동성이 막대한 투기적 자산 구매를 위한 대출로 이어지게 방관하고 있다. 

금융시장 버블에 대해 금융정책기관들이 근시안적인 행동을 취하고 있는 것 역시 과거를 답습하고 있다. 예를 들면, 미국연방준비은행(Federal Reserve)은 1998년 장외파생상품(LTCM: Long Term Capital Management) 시장의 붕괴 이후 금융기관을 구제해 주는 결정을 내린 바있다. 그러한  개입직후, 미국회계감사원(GAO)는 그 같은 구제에 대하여 다음과 같이 평가했다. 

… 연방준비은행이 대형금융기관을 대신하여 개입 할 것이라는 믿음을 줌으로서, 그 기관들이 더 많은 리스크를 감수하도록 장려한 셈이 되었다  … 연방준비은행의 개입으로 인해 사람들은 “대마불사(too big to fail)”의 신조가 확대 되었다고 우려했다 … 연방정부의 안전망이 확보되었다고 기업들이 믿게 된다면 이들이 더 리스크가 큰 사업을 추구하는 행태를 조장하게 된다. 

무분별한 확장에 대한 이러한 예측은 글로벌 금융위기 이전에 이미 쓰여진 것이다.  정부, 중앙은행 및 민간부문 금융기관의 정책 방안은 대출기관과 채무자의 손해 리스크를 줄이도록 개입하는 것에 초점을 맞추어 왔는데, 이것은 자산가격 상승에 올인하는 사람들을 유리한 입장에, 반대로 보다 신중하게 접근하는 사람들은 불리한 입장에 놓이게 하는 것이다.  

1984년 경제개혁 이전 뉴질랜드에서도 유사한 방향의 움직임들이 있었다. 그리고 1994년부터 2008년까지 중도좌파와 중도우파 정부들은 후속조치로 15년 연속 재정흑자를 실현한 바 있다. 그리고 뉴질랜드 중앙은행은 물가안정 또는 최소한의 낮은 인플레이션을 목표로 삼았기 때문에  정부가 막대한 재정 적자를 초래한 타국가들과는 다르게 아시아금융위기와 글로벌 금융위기를 상대적으로 잘 해결할 수 있는 위치에 있었다.   

뉴질랜드정부는 글로벌 금융 위기와 코로나위기에 대한 대응으로 확장 재정정책을 실행하였고 이러한 조치는 불가피한 측면이 있었다. 글로벌금융위기 이후, 재정정책은 신중한 자세를 견지 하였으며, 또 마땅히 그렇게 했어야 했다. 다만, 앞선 두 위기와 현재의 코로나-19 대응은 중요한 차이점이 있는데, 바로 코로나 대응을 위한 중앙은행의 조치는 유동성 및 자산가격의 큰 상승을 초래했다는 점이다. 이러한 조치는 뉴질랜드를 자산가격의 붕괴 위험에 노출시키는 것이고 이것은 향후 경제적 고통을 야기할 수 있다. 지속이 불가능한 재정정책과 및 통화정책으로 인하여 금융위기 리스크에 적신호가 켜졌다. 

지난 40년 동안 공공정책에 대한 경제학자들의 가르침은 “이번에도 다르지 않다(this time is not different)”는 이 보고서의 통찰력있는 메시지와도 일맥상통하다.

보고서요약

이 보고서는 글로벌 금융시스템의 안정성에 대해 경고하고, 이에 대한 근거를 제시한다. 특히 미국, 유럽연합, 영국, 일본 등의 세계 주요국가들의 최근 행보는 또 한번의 글로벌 금융위기를 초래할 수 있다. 중국의 불투명한 부채 문제에 대해서도 우려가 크다.

각 국의 주요 중앙은행들은 전례 없는 수준으로 금리를 인하하고 자산을 매입하는 양적 완화를 단행하고 있다. 1694년 이후 영국중앙은행(Bank of England: BOE)의 재할인금리가 지금처럼 낮았던 적이 없다. GDP대비 자산가치도 전례없이 높다.

대규모 정부재정적자와 극심한 국가부채가 일상화되고 있다.  재정적자와 국가부채 문제는 금리가 예년 수준으로 올라갈 경우에 훨씬 더 심각해질 것이다.

역사적으로 보면 국가부채비율은 전쟁을 치룬다든지 하는 특별한 필요에 의해서 높아졌지만, 평화 시에는 천천히 감소하는 경향을 보여왔다. 그러나 평화 시기라고 할 수 있는 지금 현재, 국가부채비율은 충격적인 수준이다.

주요 선진국에서 국가부채는 공공부문의 자산 가치를 넘어서고 있다. 이들 정부들은 납세자인 국민들의 미래를 저당잡고 있는 것이나 마찬가지이다.

현재 각국의 금융당국의 대응을 보면 2007년 글로벌금융위기(GFC) 당시의 이례적인 수준의 대응보다도 더 극단적이다. 중앙은행은 금리를 대폭 인하하고 아주 이례적인 수준으로 대출을 확대하고 있다. 다시 말해, 정부가 그들의 금융기관들에게 긴급구제금융(bail out)을 제공하고 있는 셈이다.

이러한 조치는 일견 이해가능한 면도 있으나, 미래의 큰 리스크를 야기한다. 정책결정자들은 시장원칙을 무시하고, 여론을 악화시키고, 국가부채비율 증가를 부채질하고 있다. 당국에서 이러한 비용을 고려하지 않은 것은 아니다. 다만, 그들의 절실한 과제는 고용과 경제활동의 유지였다.

Covid-19 팬데믹 이전에도 세계 주요국들은 글로벌금융위기 이전 수준으로 금융정책이 정상화되지 못한 상태였다. (예외적으로 뉴질랜드는 대부분 글로벌금융위기 이전 수준으로 정상화되었다고는 하지만, 뉴질랜드를 세계 주요국이라고 하기 어렵다). 코로나 팬데믹으로 인해 국가부채비율과 순 금융 부채(net financial liabilities)는 전례없는 수준으로 증가하였다. 이것은 톱니바퀴 효과처럼 한쪽 방향으로만 움직이게 되기 때문에 우리를 미래의 글로벌금융위기로 이끌 가능성이 크다.

인위적으로 낮춘 금리는 역효과를 낳게 된다. 인위적으로 낮은 금리는 사람들로 하여금 과대평가되고 리스크가 큰 자산을 매입하기 위해 대출을 받도록 부추긴다. 그러한 결정은 암울한 결말을 맞이하게 될 가능성이 크다. 이러한 조치들은 또한 “좀비 기업(zombie firm)”이라고 불리는 기업들, 즉 미래는 없고 부채만 많은 기업도 근근히 생명을 연장하게 할 것이다. 이 좀비 기업들은 다른 기업들이 더 잘 활용할 수 있는 자원을 점유하고 있다. 그들은 또한 정부로 하여금 더 많이 빌리고, 덜 신중하게 지출하도록 조장한다. 이것은 다 미래에 큰 비용을 치루게 된다.

이러한 최근의 현상들은 다음과 같은 질문을 낳는다. 글로벌 금융시스템이 어떻게 하다가 이 지경까지 오게 되었는가? 앞으로는 어떻게 될 것인가? 뉴질랜드 정부와 국민들은 어떻게 책임 있는 행동을 할 것인가?

첫 번째 질문에 대한 간단명료한 대답은 우리의 시스템이 정부, 금융기관 및 투자자를 금융 리스크로부터 과도하게 보호했기 때문이라는 것이다. 정부를 포함해 모든 이들은, 납세자인 국민들이 리스크에 대해 계약심사(underwriting)를 하고 있다고 여길 때 덜 주의하게 된다. 이러한 행태는 소위 도덕적 해이(moral hazard)라고 불리기도 한다.

이 문제의 원인은 애초에 설계가 잘못되었다기 보다는 상황변화로 인한 것이라고 볼 수 있다.  평화 시기의 인플레이션은 고전적 금본위제를 고수하는 국가들에서는 미미한 수준이었다.  불황 속 물가상승 현상인 스태그플레이션(stagflation)은 1971년 미국이 금본위제를 폐지한 후 발생했다. 그리고 인플레이션을 줄여야 하는 고통스러운 디스인플레이션 과정이 뒤따랐다.

1990년대에 각국정부들은 0-2% 대의 낮은 인플레이션을 목표로 하는 통화정책에 집중했고 이러한 시도들은 꽤 성공적이었다. 이 시기에는 낮은 인플레이션과 함께 완만한 경제성장이 이어졌다.

그러나 1990년대에 글로벌 금융위기의 씨앗이 뿌려지고 있었다. 정부정책은 지나치게 리스크가 큰 부동산담보대출을 조장했다. 투자자들은 자산가격이 폭락할 경우에는 미국연방준비은행이 금융기관을 지원하기 위해 기꺼이 나선다는 것을 목격했다.

‘대마불사(too big to fail)’ 및 ‘그린스펀 풋(Greenspan Put)’과 같은 용어들은 금융업계의 일반적인 문법이 되었다. 거대한 미국정부 후원기관은 모기지 관련 보안위험을 감수했다. 신용평가기관들은 리스크를 제대로 파악하는데 실패했다. 심지어는 유럽중앙은행(European Central Bank)조차도 금융시장의 추락을 피하기 위해 모든 것을 감수하겠다고 약속하였다.

반면, 일본은 다른 경로로 글로벌 금융위기를 겪었다. 일본은 1970년대 스태그플레이션을 경험하지 않은 국가이다. 다만, 일본은 급격한 부동산가격 상승을 1980년대에 겪었으며, 1990초반에는 일본 경제침체와 함께 부동산가격이 폭락하게 되었다.

일본정부는 재정적자를 감수하고서도 경제활동을 활성화하기 위해 금융정책을 폈다. 일본중앙은행(Bank of Japan)은 점점 더 극단적인 통화정책을 실시했다. 경제성장은 여전히 ​​취약했다.

일본은 글로벌금융위기 이후에도 이와 같은 정책경로를 고수해왔으며 다른 많은 선진국들도 동일한 조치를 많이 실시했다. 자산가치가 뒷받침되지 않는 국가부채의 급증은 일상화되었다.

앞서 말한 세가지 질문 중 두 번째 질문과 관련하여서는, 앞으로 자산가격, 인플레이션, 생산량 및 실업과 관련하여 굉장히 안좋은 일들이 펼쳐질 것으로 예상한다.

정부와 중앙은행의 극단적인 조치들을 어떻게 정상화할 수 있을 것인지 대책이 없다. 일본이 먼저 이런 상황에 빠졌고 스스로 빠져나올 수 없음을 보여주었다.

정부는 재정적자를 줄일 경우 실업이 증가할 것을  걱정한다. 중앙은행들도 금리 인상을 할 경우 실업에 미칠 영향을 우려한다. 소위 “좀비 기업” 들은 분명히 도산할 것이다. 금리가 높아지면 재정적자도 증가하는데, 이는 국가부도로 이어질 우려가 있다.

통화정책은 재정정책과 점점 더 밀접하게 연결되고 있다. 이러한 통화정책의 정치화(politicisation)는 금융시장의 안정성을 크게 위협한다. 다급해진 정부는 중앙은행이 낮은 이자율로 그들의 재정적자 문제를 해결하기 원한다. 유럽 ​​중앙은행의 국채매입은 상당한 기간 동안 이탈리아와 일부 다른 국가의 정부재정적자 수준을 초과했다. 이러한 행보는 법적으로, 도덕적으로, 경제적으로 지속 가능하지 않다.

또 한번의 글로벌 금융위기가 시작되면 자산가격이 폭락하고 금융공황상태가 야기될 것이다. 실업과 대규모파산 사태가 이어질 것이다. 극단적인 인플레이션에 이어 디플레이션 상황이 오게되면 은행예금과 현금의 가치가 파괴될 수 있다. 많은 사람들이 부의 상당부분을 잃게 될 것이다.

미래에 글로벌 금융위기가 발생하면 모든 사람들은 정부에게 파산만을 막아주도록 경기부양(keep the economy afloat)을 하도록 기대할 것이다.  정부는 정치적으로 어렵지만 꼭 필요할 결단을 하기 어려워진다. 아쉽게도 정부가 그렇게 할 수 있는 역량도 줄어들고 있다.

그렇게 되면, 유권자들은 불행한 정권을 퇴진시킬 것이다. 유권자들은 포퓰리스트 또는 독재주의 정부로 기존의 정권을 대체할 수도 있다. 실망과 불안이 따를 것이다. 예측불가능한 미래가 펼쳐질 것이다.

이것은 선진국 경제의 최악의 시나리오이다.

이보다 더 낙관적인 시나리오가 있을 수 있다. 이자율과 인플레이션이 낮게 유지되는 동안 강력하고 지속적인 경제성장이 필요하다. 또한 정부는 지출을 늘리기보다는 재정적자를 줄이기 위한 세입 증가노력을 기울여야 한다. 안타깝게도 이 시나리오는 모든 면에서 문제가 있다. 그로 인해 낙관적인 시나리오는 단순히 희망사항(wishful thinking)일 수 있다.

이 보고서는 두 가지 다른 시나리오를 고려하고 있다. 하나는 선진국 경제는 일반적으로 절뚝거리게 될 것이라는 시나리오로, 1990년대 초반 이후 일본과 같은 상황이라고 보면 된다. 경제침체가 계속되고 순공공부채비율은 GDP의 200%를 넘게 된다. 인플레이션은 최소한으로, 이자율도  낮은 수준을 유지한다.

인플레이션이 문제가 된다면 금리를 올려 채무자에게 부담을 줄 수 있다. 글로벌 금융위기를 어떻게든 피하게 되더라도 1970년대의 스태그플레이션 사태와 비슷한 시나리오가 전개될 수 있다.

뉴질랜드가 글로벌 금융폭풍으로부터 스스로를 가장 잘 보호 할 수 있는 방법은 무엇인가? 뉴질랜드 국민들은 이상적인 상황을 원할 수 있겠지만, 그런 낙관론에만 의존해서는 안된다. 앞서 설명한 세계적인 흐름는 전례가 없었다.

소국 경제(small economies)의 경우 신중한 방어조치가 거의 유일한 대안이다. 뉴질랜드정부는 다음 금융위기가 닥치기 전에 국영기관(Crown)의 순자산과 공공 순부채를 합리적인 수준까지 회복시킬 계획을 세워야 한다. 이러한 조지들은 계속적인 지출증가를 억제한다는 것을 의미한다. 독립적으로 운영되는 재정위원회가 의회에 보고하는 것이 도움이 될 수 있다. 뉴질랜드의 외환보유고 상황이 검토될 수 있는데, 특히 금 보유고에 관해 그러한 검토가 필요할 수 있다. 준비은행은 긴급구제금융을 정상화하고 금리를 인상하는 명확한 계획을 가지고 있어야 한다.

뉴질랜드 정부가 덜 신중할수록 개인차원에서 뉴질랜드 국민 개개인은 더 신중해야 한다. 현재의 가격으로 부동산이나 주식을 매수하기 위해 무리하게 대출을 감행하는 것은  개인의 미래를 가지고 러시안룰렛 게임을 하는 것과 마찬가지로 위험하다. 포트폴리오를 분산투자해야 한다. 디플레이션과 인플레이션 문제가 발생할 가능성이 모두 존재한다.

Report: The Need to Build – The Demographic Drivers of Housing Demand

Leonard Hong

The political ‘buck passing’ of the responsibility for unaffordable housing by successive governments in New Zealand has created extremely expensive housing markets in cities such as Auckland and Wellington – and a national housing crisis. Auckland is the sixth least affordable city among 92 major global housing markets, according to the 2020 Demographia housing survey. The real price of housing in New Zealand increased by 171% from 2000 to 2019, compared with just 11% in Germany in the same period. Despite former Housing Minister Phil Twyford’s reforms, the government has prioritised supressing demand and targeting financial speculation from overseas. Demand-side solutions are just tinkering at the edges of the problem. Long-term demographic transformations and changing household sizes are affecting overall housing demand. Inflexible housing development is the core problem, and only freeing up enough supply can solve our housing unaffordability and overcrowding.

The projections in this report show that our housing problems are set to worsen. From 2019 to 2038, the annual average additional dwellings needed will increase from 26,246 (‘low’ migration and ‘low’ fertility) to 34,556 (‘medium’ migration and ‘high’ fertility). From 2019 to 2060, we will need 15,319 (‘low’ migration and ‘low’ fertility) and 29,052 (‘medium’ migration and ‘high’ fertility) additional dwellings annually. These figures do not take into account the annual demolition and replacement rate of dwellings and the current undersupply of 40,000. Since 1992, New Zealand has added only 21,445 net private dwellings annually to the housing stock. We are simply not building enough to meet the looming demographic changes and demands.

Our housing needs are also set to rise much faster than population growth. The average annual number of dwellings needed based on just projected population growth, excluding the smaller household size, was between 5,452 (‘low’ migration and ‘low’ fertility) and 21,543 (‘medium’ migration and ‘high’ fertility) to 2060 in our analysis. The difference represents an annual shortfall of 9,867 dwellings for the former and 7,509 for the latter (or 64% and 26%, respectively). This means housing policy using only projected population growth will markedly underestimate future demand.

Covid-19 and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s monetary response to the ongoing recession has led to much financial capital flowing into the housing market. Consequently, the national house price average reached $725,000, an increase of 19.8% from October 2019 to October 2020. Low interest rates created incentives for greater borrowing and investments in real assets such as financial stocks and housing. However, if sound institutional arrangements were established and growing supply could meet growing demand, there would be far fewer speculative incentives.

Local councils and Statistics New Zealand already factor demographic changes in their household and dwelling projections, but the effect of the average household size on housing demand is rarely discussed in the public sphere. The aggregate housing demand is based not just on population growth, but also the composition of each household. With household sizes shrinking, fewer people living with many children, and population ageing, we have ‘empty nests’ and ‘crowded houses’.



For this report, we calculated long-term population numbers using the demographic software Spectrum. Based on three fundamental factors – net migration, total fertility, and life expectancy – 36 scenarios were projected to 2060 (and 2038 for dwelling projections). In 33 out of the 36 scenarios, New Zealand’s population in 2060 will be larger than it is today. Under all 36 scenarios, the median age will be higher. The 36 scenarios were further narrowed to the six most plausible based on New Zealand’s recent demographic history. Among the six, the variation in median age and population size by 2060 was vast – the projected population ranged between 5.55 million and 7.26 million, while the median age was between 41.0 and 48.5 years. Even if migration is low (say, 14,000 per annum), New Zealand’s population will still grow substantially over the next few decades.

The current housing crisis is just the tip of the iceberg – if the government does not change course, future generations will face abysmal housing affordability prospects. Stopping migration completely would only produce new problems while doing little to fix the housing problem.

Demographic changes also have long-term implications for fiscal prudence. Under the six most plausible Spectrum scenarios, the dependency rate rose with population ageing, and the number of those over 65 years by at least 23% by 2060. This will result in fewer future taxpayers and more demands on working-age New Zealanders to fund public services such as healthcare and pensions.

Policymakers need to make our economic institutions more versatile so New Zealand can cope with any combination of demographic or household scenarios in the future. New Zealand had net zero migration in 2020 due to Covid-19 related border closures but this did not stop housing inflation. Politicians should stop blaming the housing crisis on migration, land banking investment, and speculation, and instead find policy solutions to free up urban development and housing supply. Faster productivity growth too would help fund additional public services in the long term.

Building now and fast is imperative for the nation’s future economic and social wellbeing.

Click below to download the two-page summary of The Need to Build: The demographic drivers of housing demand.

Research Note: Safe Arrivals

Dr. Eric Crampton and Leonard Hong

Up to a million Kiwis live overseas with a right to return to New Zealand. While the country is now effectively free of Covid-19, with cases only in the country’s quarantine facilities, the pandemic rages abroad and is unlikely to abate anytime soon. Even if a vaccine is developed this year, scaling up its production will take time. In the meantime, the Government must scale up its own capabilities and capacity within its managed isolation and quarantine facilities.

This report provides a pathway toward safer scaling-up of border capabilities. It begins from the principle that safe entry should be allowed, and that risky entry must be made safe.

Beginning from that principle, the report argues that the New Zealand border should be reopened to travellers arriving from places that are similarly free of Covid-19. Islands in the Realm of New Zealand depend on travel to and from New Zealand and are currently Covid-free. Taiwan has no community transmission and has pandemic control systems at least as strong as New Zealand’s. Maintaining border restrictions against travel to and from safe places imposes substantial harm. Continued closed borders to the Pacific Islands imposes an onerous humanitarian burden along with economic calamity.

Like kayakers in stormy seas rafting up together for safety, New Zealand should ‘raft up’ with other Covid-free places.

Entry from other locations must be made safe. And while closing borders entirely can feel like the right response when other parts of the world are in dire straits, it is impossible. Too many Kiwis live abroad and may wish to return. The managed isolation and quarantine system must be able to scale up to accommodate those people along with potential non-citizen visitors from similar locations.

This report argues that the Government should shift its approach. Rather than considering charging some arriving Kiwis for their stays in managed isolation, it should instead directly subsidise the stays of returning Kiwis whose stays the Government would wish to support with a voucher system.

Under the proposed voucher system, those wishing to come to New Zealand – citizens or not – would be required to present before boarding proof of a booking in one of the approved managed isolation facilities. Eligible returning Kiwis could apply their vouchers toward the full or partial cost of their stay in managed isolation. Vouchers could be set at a level consistent with the cost of a stay at a basic facility. Other returnees would need to bear the full cost of their stay. Facilities would be free to set their own room fees, but the Government would charge each facility for the full cost of police, military and other staff involved with managing isolation.

The Government would continue to oversee safety in managed isolation and private accommodation facilities would continue to provide the rooms. But this shift would make it far easier for returning Kiwis, and others, to manage their own arrivals while freeing the Government of the burden of scrambling to place arriving visitors into scarce spaces in managed isolation. It would also encourage other facilities to shift into providing managed isolation services (under Government oversight and supervision).

The present system is strained. It struggles to accommodate need, but must scale up substantially if Kiwis abroad choose to exercise their right to return home. Allocating scarce positions in managed isolation by Ministerial discretion forces Ministers into impossible positions in deciding whose need is greatest.

Being able to scale up safely is critically important. The entire country made incredibly costly efforts to make New Zealand effectively Covid-free. Some Kiwis continue to bear those costs through family separation, unemployment or failing businesses. And for a long time yet, the country will be paying off the new government debt accrued to help the economy survive lockdown.

Improving border protocols to allow for safe entry at scale would not only help those worst affected by the collective elimination efforts, it would open up opportunities that simply were not available in the pre-pandemic world. Rather than trying to estimate the extent of New Zealand’s likely economic losses, the country could be looking at stronger economic opportunities.

Recommendations
The New Zealand Government should:

  • Set a principle to allow safe entry into New Zealand;
  • Recognise that entry from safe places by people who have not recently been to risky places is safe. Re-open the border to entry from Taiwan and the Covid-free Pacific Islands and assess whether individual Australian states could be considered safe;
  • Support the Pacific Island neighbours in ensuring safe external borders;
  • Continue to assess the adequacy of safety protocols on flights to risky places and at airports handling passengers from risky places;
  • Allow greater scaling-up of managed isolation by:
    o Allowing those arriving to take up a greater portion of the cost: full user-pays for non-citizens and a voucher-based co-payment scheme for returning residents and citizens;
    o Certifying facilities as authorised providers of managed isolation or quarantine services;
    o Charging isolation facilities for the isolation management services provided by the government;
    o Allowing facilities to provide their own management services if they are able to credibly demonstrate capability of doing so safely, but only under strict supervision and process auditing;
    o Requiring all arrivals book their own accommodation in authorised isolation facilities and provide proof of booking before boarding flights to New Zealand;
    o Training potential isolation management staff;
    o Charging isolation facilities for the isolation services provided by the government on a full cost-recovery basis;
  • Layering additional safety protocols for non-citizens arriving from risky places to further reduce risk as numbers increase, such as post-isolation testing and daily health check-ins;
  • Consult with New Zealand’s epidemiologist community over the medium term as both testing and app-based technologies develop to assess whether alternative sets of restrictions could reduce risk at lower cost for travellers from less risky but not risk-free places.

Research Note: Lessons from Abroad: East Asia’s Covid-19 Containment Model

Leonard Hong with assistance from Joel Hernandez

Since the first cases of the Covid-19 virus emerged in the Chinese province of Wuhan, several East Asian countries including Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have successfully ‘flattened the curve’ of infection rates. The three countries used common public policies in the first 50 days since each registered their 100th case.

This report summaries how the three countries prepared for a pandemic to create the best possible position for dealing with Covid-19. It offers lessons for New Zealand’s efforts to set up efficient epidemiological controls and tracking efforts to help fight any future pandemic.

Research Note: Lessons from Abroad: Taiwan’s Covid-19 Containment Model

Leonard Hong with assistance from Joel Hernandez

Alongside South Korea, Taiwan is one of the few countries to “flatten the curve” of Covid-19 without a national lockdown due to its prior experience with the SARS epidemic of 2003. New Zealand’s pathway is similar to Taiwan’s and there are lessons to be learned as New Zealand moves into Alert Level 2. Last week, Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters suggested creating “international bubbles” for countries with Covid-19 success to introduce new trade connections and travel links. His reasoning is that direct inbound travel to New Zealand from Taiwan cannot be riskier than travel within New Zealand at this point.

As of May 11, Taiwan is 53 days into its Covid-19 response compared to New Zealand’s 49 days (measured by the date of the first 100 cases). Judging by cumulative cases per capita (see figures 1 and 2), New Zealand has 24.8 cases per 100,000 while Taiwan only has 1.9 cases per 100,000. 

In early January, when the first outbreak began in Wuhan, Taiwanese Professor Dr Jason Wang from Stanford University predicted Taiwan would have the highest number of cases outside mainland China.1 As of May 10, Taiwan only has 73 active cases and 366 recoveries from a total of 438 confirmed cases.2 It also has a low case fatality rate (CFR) of 1.3% or 1.36% deaths. Italy, Spain, the US and New Zealand have CFRs of 13.9%, 10.1%, 5.9% and 1.4%, respectively.

The Taiwanese Government dealt with the initial rise in cases while maintaining an open economy by using optimal border controls, strict quarantine requirements, targeted testing measures, an advanced national healthcare system, effective contact tracing system, maskwearing public policy, tight enforcement of new Covid-19 rules and general government competence.

This report outlines eleven key examples of Taiwan’s pandemic approach.

Research Note: Lessons from Abroad: South Korea’s Covid-19 Containment Model

Leonard Hong with assistance from Joel Hernandez

As the world struggles to contain Covid-19, many countries are at different stages of containment and mitigation since registering their first 100 cases. Some, like South Korea, are more than a month further ahead compared with New Zealand and could offer a good example of what might be expected as New Zealand transitions out of Alert Level 4 lockdown.

As of April 20, South Korea is 91 days into its Covid-19 response compared to New Zealand’s 52 days. New Zealand appears to be on the same trajectory as South Korea measured by total cumulative cases and cumulative cases per capita. New Zealand has 29 cases per 100,000 people while South Korea has 20 cases per 100,000, showing that both are flattening their epidemiological curves. 

Early in the pandemic, Covid-19 cases in South Korea sharply increased, peaking at 909 new cases after 41 days. But as of April 20, South Korea only has 2385 active cases and 8042 recoveries from a total of 10,674 confirmed cases. It also has a low case fatality rate (CFR) of 0.2% or 236 deaths. Italy, Spain, the US, and New Zealand have CFRs of 13.2%, 10.3%, 5.3% and 0.8%, respectively. 

Although the South Korean government failed to stop the initial transmission of the virus from overseas, it speedily dealt with the first Shincheonji’s clusters in Daegu while maintaining an open economy, effective border controls, high-level diagnostic testing, strict enforcement of Covid-19 rules, efficient contact tracing and government transparency. It even avoided a national lockdown by giving local governments the authority to shut only parts of their districts.

The effectiveness of these policies was boosted by public solidarity, civil compliance, the prominent use of face masks and the widely understood lessons of previous virus outbreaks.

This report outlines seven key examples of South Korea’s pandemic approach and shares the lessons for New Zealand.

Research Note: Lessons from Abroad: Singapore’s Covid-19 Containment Model

Leonard Hong

Singapore has set a high standard for dealing with Covid-19 and despite its decision to enter a lockdown this week, New Zealand can learn a lot from the country, according to a new report Lessons from abroad: Singapore’s Covid-19 containment model from the New Zealand Initiative.

Although Singapore has enacted a “circuit breaker” lockdown to defend against some new sources of coronavirus, it could make this choice due to its earlier efforts to identify, control and contain the pandemic threatening its territory.

New Zealand Initiative research assistant Leonard Hong said since Singapore reached its 100th confirmed Covid-19 case in March, it now has a similar number of cases per capita to New Zealand.

Neither country is yet through the worst of the pandemic, but speedy government action helps explain both countries’ relatively low case rate.

“Singapore’s main point of difference was its early and aggressive border security measures. Its first line of defence restricted travel from countries profoundly affected by the coronavirus, such as China, despite the World Health Organisation not recommending travel restrictions at the time.”

“It has also implemented one of the world’s most restrictive quarantine measures, including digital surveillance tracking systems to monitor those possibly infected with the virus,” Hong said.

While many countries encourage citizens to self-isolate to slow the spread of the virus, they find it tough to enforce those commands, particularly when the rules have not yet become laws.

However, Singapore authorities have already issued hefty fines for some individuals not complying with quarantine rules, and even repealed the work permits and visas of others.

“The Singapore government has taken a ‘no-nonsense’ approach when enforcing its rules by using excellent technological surveillance and harsh penalties,” Hong said.

He added that Singapore is rigorously conducting and boosting its testing regime to be one of the highest per capita rates in the world, although its rate is still slightly below New Zealand’s.

The city-state’s tight border and screening protocols also give the government greater visibility into which people encounter possible Covid-19 cases. It has created 20 dedicated Contract Tracing teams, under the jurisdiction of the police, to locate and monitor at risk individuals.

The teams are using a new, publicly available mobile software app to help warn citizens when they might be in proximity to infected people. The free source code for the app will be opened up for other countries to adopt.

“New Zealand’s government decided to enact a lockdown 26 days after its first case on February 28. By comparison, Singapore took 75 days since its first case on January 23 to enact its ‘circuit breaker’ phase showing that some of its earlier measures for containment were effective,” Hong said.

“Singapore’s early containment policies were a model for the world that the right policy decisions could make significant differences to the problems of Covid-19. New Zealand should keep an eye on what it does next.”

Research Note: Effective Treatment: Public Policy subscription for a pandemic

Dr. Eric Crampton with assistance from Leonard Hong

Unless effective treatment for the novel coronavirus Covid-19 emerges quickly, the world faces not only misery but economic depression. New Zealand will be immune to neither. The normal economic uncertainties of a downturn will be compounded by the uncertainties of a pandemic.

The New Zealand Government’s policy needs to directly boost capabilities in the health sector while providing the kind of appropriate economic support necessary when we’re all taking a lengthy staycation and some industries are put on ice.

Uncertainty about the duration of this crisis makes deciding on the most suitable policy difficult.

So, a combination of policies is warranted. Our latest report, Effective Treatment, explains our approach.

The first priority must be with health.

Increasing the capacity of the health sector to deal with peaks in numbers of Covid cases is important to reduce mortality and morbidity rates. But nobody quite seems to know just where the binding constraints in the health sector are. While credible newspaper articles warn about substantial shortages in equipment and incredible pressure on staff, official statements have been far more sanguine.

If there really will be shortages of critical equipment in four to six weeks, potential suppliers should know that today. Quietly shoulder-tapping likely suppliers may partially solve the problem but won’t provide the necessary scale of response. Suppliers can come from unlikely places. For instance, Italian hospitals are reportedly trialling ventilators reconfigured from scuba diving equipment. Simply announcing a willingness to purchase equipment – and the prices the Government is willing to pay – would allow potential suppliers to identify themselves. Serious companies aren’t likely to re-tool without the certainty of a contract. But they do need to know the demand exists and that they can get essential service status to do the job.

Rapid identification of equipment and skills necessary to boost capability in the medical system, combined with a wide call for assistance, would enable people and businesses to find ways to help. If the health system is not already doing so, it should be offloading less-significant tasks to helpers with limited training, to ease the burden on key medical staff. For instance, thousands of air cabin crew have been trained in first aid and will have plenty of time on their hands. With some rapid training, they may be able to ease some of the burden.

Additionally, the Government has asked retired health workers and health workers furloughed by the current lockdown to assist in Covid-response. It should also consider those foreign-trained medical professionals already in the country who have not yet been able to secure New Zealand medical registration.

Part of the cure for a pandemic is a sharp reduction in economic activities in areas not related either to pandemic response or critical areas like food supply. That’s why support for workers and firms is important. But the Government’s chosen wage subsidy scheme is not working well. Even if it can be extended to larger employers, it provides too little support to keep companies from laying off staff en masse.

The Initiative urges the Government to consider a version of Germany’s Short-Time Work support policy. That scheme allows firms to shift workers to a fraction of their normal hours along with an income top-up from the Government. That way, instead of laying off 80% of staff, a company could keep staff on 20% of their normal hours with little reduction in worker earnings.

This kind of scheme is better than either relying on benefits or starting up the sometimes-promoted universal basic income (UBI). A speedy reboot of the economy when this is over matters. That is much harder to do when companies must rebuild hard-earned experience and skills from scratch. The Short-Time Work support policy maintains both workers’ incomes and their links to employers. It targets support to those workers whose hours are cut, rather than spreading support broadly to those far less affected. Simply put, it works better.

Some tax provisions can also be eased. Individuals and firms should be allowed to combine the 2020/21 tax years and temporarily suspend their PAYE collection and Kiwisaver contributions. This would immediately provide more cash in hand everyone. Companies staring down provisional tax assessments based on last year’s earnings could instead defer everything to next year.

Simultaneously, the Government could help reduce business’ fixed costs that otherwise might have compelled them to shut down. It could also cover Council rates bills for firms in financial distress, averting a major hit to the local government purse as well. And access to credit can be improved, especially over the longer term as wage support to employers may need to ease.

Finally, a modified version of the New Zealand Student Loan programme should be made available to non-students to help bridge any remaining income gaps. It has the advantage of having already set provisions for income-contingent repayment when the crisis passes.

But financial support is not the only way the Government can and should help.

Regulations that were no real barrier to getting things done in normal times can be insurmountable in a pandemic. For example, some airline pilots require time in simulators to maintain certification, but the necessary simulators are in Australia. In normal times, this just doesn’t much matter – pilots can roster onto an Australia route when and as necessary. This doesn’t work now. But the Government can’t be expected to identify every barrier proactively. It needs to rely on business to highlight the obstacles as they come up using lines of rapid communication with regulators who can suspend or modify them during this crisis.

And this is no time for policy or regulatory changes which are not related to the pandemic. The Reserve Bank and Commerce Commission have already postponed theirs. But Parliament’s Select Committees are still asking for submissions on non-urgent legislation. Doesn’t the Health Select Committee have better things to do than consider the regulatory framework for vaping? Some legislation may be urgent enough to require submissions during the Level 4 alert, but everything else should be quarantined.

Obviously, the Government should borrow the funds it needs to do all this. But this will require maintaining a disciplined approach to any spending lines unrelated to the pandemic. Entrenching new ongoing commitments would complicate a return to prudent debt levels after the crisis and make it harder to borrow the funds necessary for responding to the pandemic.

Hopefully the four weeks of Level 4 lockdown gives the Government enough time both to knock back the pandemic and adjust policy to help us through the coming economic turmoil. We need to adopt more effective treatment.