Fundamental Problems in Economics

Is Donald Trump a populist?
A famous national populist, former US President Donald Trump

The economy is not an understandable and controllable machine as assumed by conventional macroeconomic theory. Rather, the economy is a complex, adaptive system, like many others in nature and society, in which policies can have significant, unintended consequences. 

Former BIS Chief Economist William R. White

We are dealing with an intellectual problemโ€”a profession that has been absorbed by theoretical constructs abstracting from human behaviour. We are dealing with ingrained ways of thinking. The challenge is to raise questions about accepted approaches, in drawing lessons from recent experience. We need to pull economics back into the real world of political economy.

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker

We also have to recognize that good economics cannot be divorced from good politics: this is perhaps a reason why the field of economics was known as political economy. The mistake economists made was to believe that once countries had developed a steel frame of institutions, political influences would be tempered.

Former IMF Chief Economist and University of Chicago Professor Raghuram Rajan

Leonard’s Curiosity in Economics

My interest in the political dimensions of economic policy began while I was still an undergraduate student at the University of Auckland. I was intrigued by the rise of Bernie Sanders in the United States and Donald Trump in 2015. They both represented movements against the status quo of government. Meanwhile, in my Economics courses, I was learning about macroeconomic models of endogenous growth, the Solow-Swan theory of technological progress, Paul Krugman’s liquidity trap theory, Milton Friedman’s monetarist theory, among other frameworks. An intense interest in both Political Science and Economics led me to major in both disciplines (History and International Business were later added in 2018).

Theoretical economic models were fascinating. Yet, in my mind economists have been missing the mark.

I was particularly intrigued by the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008. What caused it? The greed of Wall Street, easy monetary policy, or institutional corruption? Globalisation? Are there political influences at play? Exactly how can geniuses from Ivy League universities make such an error? I was perplexed by the global financial crisis and remained keenly interested in it (so much so that I even co-authored a report on the potentials for the next financial crisis in 2021).

The failure of world-renowned economists – in the likes of Larry Summers – to identify the fundamental causes of the GFC (and the aggregated political effects of that crisis) convinced me that the discipline required fundamental reform.

My education at the University of Auckland contributed to my intellectual framework. However, the models and theories that I learned in my economics classes were insufficient to prepare me to be an excellent economist. I believe that the study of Political Science, Psychology and Economic History should become complementary areas for students studying Economics.

As someone who also holds a degree in History, the economic topics within all of the courses I took always intrigued me. Among these themes are, for example, the role of hyperinflation in the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler; the rise of Keynesian economics and the New Deal; the rise of the Bretton Woods system and its effects on international affairs; the revival of Communist China under Deng Xiaoping; and the experience of New Zealand under Rogernomics and Ruthanasia. In contrast to my colleagues who were studying other topics, I was fascinated by economic problems and how they affected the political system in general. As I see it, Economics is a hybrid of the humanities and the sciences – a social science. I was told by my history lecturer, Dr Paul Taillon, that I had more of a ‘political economy’ bent. I fully concurred with his assessment.

My involvement in Economics as a discipline was motivated by this experience. An overview of my obsession with the subject is presented in this section. It is fascinating to me and I intend to continue my studies in the future. In the next section, I will explain the fundamental causes of the GFC and why many economists got their predictions completely wrong.

The Failures of Economists: Predicting GFC

Many economists, including Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, admitted they were wrong in the wake of the first major economic catastrophe since the Great Depression. Most mainstream economists failed to predict the onset of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 (with notable exceptions such as William R. White, Niall Ferguson, Raghuram Rajan and Kenneth Rogoff). There was a great deal of hubris and arrogance in the profession.

By the beginning of the 1960s, mathematicians and engineers were becoming increasingly involved in the economics discipline, leading to the development of econometric models as a dominant source of policy analysis. One of the main reasons this occurred is the rise of mathematical economics. Paul Samuelson and other ‘technical’ economists popularised this sub-discipline. Prior to this disciplinary revolution, the subject was called ‘political economy’, not economics as we all understand it today. Through mathematic economic modelling, increasingly more experts have become almost certain that modelling meant that it will be reflected in the real world. In many ways because of what the numbers told them, many determined that the risk of financial collapse has been eliminated. Financial markets are supposedly safer as a result of the ‘Great Moderation’ and technocratic management of the economy. Francis Fukuyama’s End of History did not help. It created further arrogance and complacency among western elites, believing that they were destined to spread free markets and liberal democracy globally. However, with the bursting of the housing bubble in 2007, the Great Moderation of 1987-2006 proved to be a myth as it led to the collapse of the global economy.   

The GFC taught me that economics was not an entirely objective or empirical discipline in the same vein as mathematics, chemistry, and physics. In the words of former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, “Economists have brought the problem upon themselves by pretending they can forecast. No one can predict the unknowable future and economists are now exception”. Economists forgot a very important concept called ‘radical uncertainty’.

In terms of quantitative predictions, in many ways they are correct in the modelling. But it is correct in real life? No. The models are not perfect. Individuals are not fully rational. Statistical formulas and mathematical equations can get manipulated to provide the authors of a particular research paper with data that supports their hypothesis.

I do not claim, however, that empiricism does not matter – it does matter to a considerable degree. Using models, we can obtain an understanding of what is happening throughout our economic system. We would struggle to solve problems without the aid of hypotheses testing and quantitative methods. But it does become problematic when economists strictly rely on models, as fundamentalist beliefs, akin to the scientific fact of gravity.

Pricing for options is an example of this. The Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to Robert Merton of Harvard University and Myron Scholes of Stanford University for their contribution to calculating stock options (a form of derivatives). In the financial world, it was believed that ‘rational’ calculations of these risky investments were feasible. But this was utter nonsense. It is nearly impossible to determine the value of these complex financial instruments. Analysts have devised numbers to create an impression of credibility. It was just a bogus form of quantification. There was a quasi-religious belief among people in the financial sector that risk had virtually disappeared following the introduction of these objective models. This legitimized financial gambling. This intellectual debacle was caused by the dogmatism of belief in ‘market perfection’ and ’empiricism’. Economist Raghuram Rajan questioned this dogma of the financialisation of the world economy in his 2005 research paper. He showed that actually banks and financial institutions were making more money via more risk, not less risk as shown by these models for derivatives. As shown in the documentary ‘Inside Job’ by Charles Ferguson, to some degree it was a form of intellectual and moral corruption where economists across elite institutions brought the idea that risk was eliminated.

The failure of economists told me a few things. There needs to be a fundamental restructure in the education of future economists. Economics as a discipline needs to combine both the ‘economic history’ and empirical methods to explain and understand complex systems like the global economy. More emphasis needs to be placed on the ‘humanity’ aspect of economics. The classical scholars in the likes of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, David Hume, John Maynard Keynes and even Hayek were not entirely mathematically driven economists. All of them were experts in the political economy. Excess objectivity within the field of economics led to financial disasters and hubris.

The GFC should have been a wake up call, but have there been some changes? Not necessarily. Economists still buy into their DSGE models and macroeconomic equilibrium hypotheses. Although some economists in the likes of Dani Rodrik, Raghuram Rajan and Joseph Stiglitz have been warning others for some time about the continued failure of their fellow colleagues to diagnose the problem. What we witnessed instead were significantly political consequences in the form of both left wing and right wing populism.

Backlash against the Technocrats – Western Populists

While the mainstream neoclassical economists continued to repeat their talking points to the world, the world was shifting to a more polarised society. The GFC did not help the cause. With millions of ordinary people losing their life savings and wealth. Simultaneously, big banks and financial institutions were bailed out without any jail time for many of the financial executives that created the problem. Injustice and economic corruption led to a growing mistrust towards public institutions.

Politically, people became very angry across the world and manifested to resentment.

As shown by Charles Murray’s ‘Coming Apart‘, much of the political discontent had to do with offshoring of manufacturing and the decline of communities in former manufacturing hubs such as Detroit. These states and regions are nicknamed Rustbelt states for a reason. These same white-working class folks lost their jobs and their livelihoods through free trade agreements and offshoring of their jobs into developing countries. The rise of opioid addiction, rising divorce rates, crime, social disintegration, declining social mobility, and educational regression led to an intergenerational downward cycle. J.D. Vance’s ‘Hillbilly Elegy’ does a wonderful job illustrating the extent of the social decay. The richer urban class in states such as California and New York saw their wages increase exponentially with more households and families in these areas getting more educated, while those in the former stronghold manufacturing states such as Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania failed to see rising incomes. As mentioned by Raghuram Rajan, the premium on College education and demand for skilled work led to growing economic inequality. Social decay and free market prescriptions were a recipe for social disintegration and political discontent.

Globalisation and international economic integration was the correct policy subscription, but the short turn effects were devastating. Although globalisation and free flow of capital and labour led to overall net-positives for the world economy (3.8 billion people in the middle class as of 2018). Economists and policymakers failed to consider these people’s livelihoods. Trade adjustment subsidies and social insurance were insufficient.

Consequently, across the western world, we saw more politicians going against these mainstream orthodoxies. Anti-European Union politicians in the likes of Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson became increasingly popular, meanwhile the US saw the rise of an anti-liberal demagogue in the form of Donald Trump. Simultaneously, left-wing populists such as Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn shocked the world with their relatively successful campaigns for President and Prime Minister (and UK Labour’s leadership).

In my eyes, a healthy dose of populism is important for liberal democracies. It provides people with the sense that something is fundamentally wrong in society and that policy adjustments were warranted. But, extreme and excess populism can lead to bad consequences as we’ve seen with the rise of Hitler and Soviet Communism post-Great Depression. Economic stability and growth is significant for a stable liberal democratic system. Systems can break down and cause revolutions if it gets out of hand. This is why understanding the root causes of contemporary populism and dealing with the problems raised is crucial. However, I’m yet to see any western politician hoping to resolve the anti-establishment populist sentiment. Nor are economists willing to provide a new approach to this ongoing political economy problem.

Conclusion

โ€œAlmost every political question has an economic aspect and almost every economic question has a political aspectโ€.

Charles P. Kindleberger

As the prominent international political economy scholar Charles Kindleberger states in this quote, economics cannot be separated from politics and vice versa. The rise of mathematical economics and econometrics are crucial to policy evaluation and analyses, but by ignoring economic and political history, we fail to learn our lessons from what really happened. Economics is not just about models – it’s about people’s livelihoods. Humans are not just rational utility maximising robots. We are complex and we cannot rely simply on microeconomic theory, presumptions and calculations as a basis for effective economic policy making.

This opinion piece was to inform readers about understanding and staying skeptical about the economics profession. I have been heavily involved in this field and public policy in the early stages of my career and even though I don’t know much in comparison to many professionals globally, I hope this piece was relatively informative. As Kenneth Rogoff mentioned before, economics should still stay relatively objective and mathematical, but we must not ignore economic history and incorporate other aspects of social science into the equation.

I am a political economy person, and I think more economists should move in this direction.

Happy New Year.

Fiscal Accountability Matters

US President Herbert Hoover once stated, โ€œBlessed are the young, for they shall inherit the national debt.โ€

Right now, young people have a reason to be concerned. Since Covid-19 arrived 18 months ago, New Zealandโ€™s net public debt has nearly doubled. Government net debt rose from 19% of GDP โ€“ Gross Domestic Product โ€“ in 2019 to 34% this year.

This is the highest ratio since 1996.

The bulk of debt increase was from the wage subsidies โ€“ around $18 billion. Other business support programmes were supplementary. These fiscal responses were intended to enable faster economic recovery.

New Zealanders were seared by the 1984 debt crisis. That experience produced a broad bipartisan consensus in favour of fiscal responsibility rules. Budget surpluses were achieved by the mid-1990s and sustained, albeit with reducing spending discipline, to 2008.

Those surpluses helped New Zealand weather the storms of the 2007-08 GFC and the Christchurch earthquake. But it took seven years of fiscal slog and expenditure restraint to restore fiscal surpluses after the GFC.

Big spending increases from 2017 preceded Covid-19 and now the challenge of turning ongoing fiscal deficits into surpluses has arisen anew.

Are current arrangements up to the task? Not in our opinion. In 2014, the New Zealand Initiative proposed a Parliamentary fiscal council to help Parliament better scrutinise government spending and fiscal prudence.

This was not out of the blue. In 2011, the OECD found that โ€œindependent fiscal institutions can buttress a governmentโ€™s capacity to comply with a numerical rule.โ€ These institutions exist in 28 of the 38 countries in the OECD.

In 2017, the-then opposition parties โ€“ Labour and the Greens โ€“ endorsed a Fiscal Council of an unclear design. The advent of Covid has stilled work on this, and there are no indications that fiscal discipline and constraint will be the heart of the Governmentโ€™s priorities.

A global pandemic understandably opens the fiscal taps, but that only heightens the need for a subsequent return to fiscal discipline and accountability. That determination is not yet evident.  

To fail to restore discipline in spending quality and current financing is to do future generations a disservice. It is fine for the young to inherit debt backed by assets of equivalent value, but not otherwise. Herbert Hooverโ€™s remark is best seen as a humorous aside that would be irresponsible if put into practice.

Walking the path?

This is a good review by Michael Reddell on my co-authored report. As he pointed out, we agree with the Goodhart/Pradhan hypothesis on the demographic implications on the global financial system.

Michael Reddell's avatarcroaking cassandra

At 11am the New Zealand Initiative released their latest report, by Bryce Wilkinson and Leonard Hong, under the title โ€œWalking the Path to the Next Financial Crisisโ€. It comes complete with a Foreword from former Reserve Bank chief economist (and former Board chair) Arthur Grimes, under the title โ€œA short walk?โ€, foretelling doom and repeating his recent attacks on the Reserve Bankโ€™s conduct of monetary policy over the last 20 months, ending with the ominous โ€“ and printed in bold โ€“ declaration โ€œThis time is not differentโ€.

The Initiative was kind enough to send me an embargoed copy yesterday. Perhaps the first thing that rather surprised me โ€“ in a document that is really quite critical of both monetary and fiscal policy and aspects of the way the Bank does other things โ€“ is that the acknowledgements include thanks to a Reserve Bank MPC member (Bob Buckle) for โ€œvaluable feedbackโ€ฆ

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In praise of aspiring โ€˜influencersโ€™

Content creators are the fastest growing type of small business worldwide. Today, over 50 million people consider themselves ‘influencers’ on social media.

According to YPulse โ€“ a youth research organisation in the United States โ€“ over 72% of Generation Z wants to become online celebrities.

Nowadays, getting famous on Instagram or TikTok is the ticket to wealth and fame. According to a Harris poll, more kids dream of becoming a YouTuber than an astronaut.

Generation Z kids do not want traditional careers in engineering, medicine, consulting, and teaching. Becoming viral on TikTok through outrageous flamboyance can make you a millionaire.  โ€œDonโ€™t need no education, donโ€™t need no thought controlโ€.

Intellectuals, social conservatives and cultural pessimists commonly decry this trend of ‘superficial consumerism’. โ€œYet another dissolute younger generation in the makingโ€, they sniff.

Yet, pop culture meets a need. No one is forcing the youthful masses to follow โ€˜influencersโ€™. Following them takes time, and buying the products they endorse swallows money.

This is not new. Teenagers have been buying โ€˜brandsโ€™ for decades. They having been indulging and experimenting in all sorts of things that affront their elders, probably from time immemorial.

So the followers of the influencers must be getting a benefit. In part, it will be a social group thing. I get that.

Moreover, โ€˜influencingโ€™ must be a competitive and risky business. Entry is free. Anyone can be outrageous and flambuoyant โ€“ until the euphoria fades. One tweak that misses its mark could destroy months or years of assiduous cultivating of oneโ€™s followers.

Take Daniel LaBelle for example. He started a physical comedy channel on TikTok last year, and now has over 23 million followers. Podcaster Joe Rogan has to entertain 200 million people monthly on Spotify.

Imagine waking up every morning wondering what you can do next to titivate such followers, without blowing everything. Who wants that pressure?

Many influencers will crash and burn, just as pop musicians have for decades.

But pop music endures because it entertains. So far influencers are passing that test.

Why we’re walking the path to the next global financial crisis

NZ Herald

The worldโ€™s major economies are walking into the next global financial crisis. Moreover, their authorities do not seem willing to change direction. They fear that raising interest rates or cutting government budget deficits risks precipitating the collapse they seek to avoid.

Those are the major conclusions of our report we released last Thursday.

In response to the Global Financial Crisis over a decade ago โ€“ and then again to Covid-19 โ€“ worldwide, major central banks have eased monetary policy settings to an extraordinary and potentially destabilising degree.

The Bank of England is the worldโ€™s oldest central bank. Never since 1697 has its control interest rate been as low as it is today (0.1% pa). Never has its balance sheet relative to gross domestic product (GDP) been as bloated from creating money as it is today. (See the following figure)

The US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan have progressively also adopted historically extreme levels for monetary policy settings.

Simultaneously, many governments have pushed their public debt ratios up to an extraordinary degree. Federal public debt held by the public was a historic high relative to GDP at the end of World War II. Congressโ€™s Office of Management and Budget now forecasts that this high will be exceeded in 2024 โ€“ a war-time like debt in peace time. This is unprecedented, and it is because of large ongoing budget deficits. The US Federal governmentโ€™s projected fiscal deficit for 2021 is an astonishing 16.7% of GDP.

In September, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned the US was heading for sovereign default if the governmentโ€™s debt ceiling was not lifted. Eventually, Congress agreed to increase the limit, but this merely kicks the debt can down the road โ€“ again.

In Europe, a condition set in 1992 for monetary union was that member countriesโ€™ gross public debt ratios should not exceed 60% of GDP. According to the latest official forecasts, only 7 of 22 countries will comply in 2021. All the largest economies now exceed 60%. The debt ratios for the seven worst cases exceed 100% โ€“ for Italy it is a crippling 166%.

Italyโ€™s high debt ratio is a serious risk to the stability of the Euro currency block. This is because its economy looks to be too large for the rest of Europe to bail out.

Lower interest rates invite governments to borrow more. The utter perversity of the current situation is epitomised by the fact that the Eurozoneโ€™s overall government net financial indebtedness has never been higher and the net interest cost lower relative to GDP. 

China is also a potential source of instability. Serious debt problems have emerged in its housing market โ€“ which accounts for 29% of its economy. This makes it of potential global significance. The debt crisis at Evergrande โ€“ the second largest property developer illustrates the concern.

Globally, persistently low interest rates encourage firms and households to borrow excessively to buy assets that would otherwise be over-priced. That contains the seeds for that next crash.

Low interest rates also prolong the existence of โ€œzombieโ€ companies that should be wound up.  Healthy companies could use their resources more productively.

High public debt ratios not backed by assets of comparable value give governments a conflict of interest. As economic managers, government should be leaning against excessive borrowing rather than fuelling it by low interest rates and quantitative easing.

Being heavily indebted compromises governmentโ€™s willingness to act.

This problem of excessive borrowing and over-priced assets has been made worse by the signal the major central banks have been sending to investors โ€“ that the authorities will โ€˜do whatever it takesโ€™to prevent any major collapse.

Professor Arthur Grimes, former chair of the Reserve Bankโ€™s board, wrote the foreword to the report. He succinctly identified that perverse incentive problem:

โ€œGovernments, central banks and private sector financial institutions have together created the seeds of the next crisis on the assumption that policy actions will protect borrowers and lenders from downside risks. The result has been a one-way bet for those positioned for asset price rises, while those who have acted prudently have been left behind.โ€

The perversity of the current situation is further illustrated by the US. In 2020, it recorded the greatest decline in economic activity (real GDP) in at least 60 years. Its unemployment rate more than doubled.

Yet US household wealth rose by a record amount (26%). In dollar terms, it rose by much more than if households had saved 100 percent of national income in 2020.

So, how could US households overall become far more prosperous amidst the biggest downturn in over 60 years? The answer is capital gains and more money in the bank because of the Federal Reserveโ€™s credit creation and low interest rates. US sharemarkets have boomed along with property prices.

The Initiativeโ€™s report traces the path to the current government โ€˜debt trapโ€™ situation, first under the gold standard and subsequently with fiat money.

There is an optimistic scenario. It requires continuing near zero interest rates; low inflation, strong growth that lifts tax revenues; and firm resolve to reduce government budget deficits.

One can hope, but each step in this scenario looks implausible. Consumer price inflation has emerged this year that can only put upwards pressure on interest rates; pressure that central banks have been resisting.

In the past, periods of excessive debt and money creation have tended to end badly. Our report considers two much less rosy, low growth, high unemployment scenarios and one disastrous one of โ€˜Great Depressionโ€™ dimensions.

We leave it for readers to decide what probabilities to put on these and other possible scenarios. Nor does the report speculate about the timing of the next global crisis.

New Zealanders can only take precautionary measures. Being a small and globally integrated economy, New Zealand cannot prevent the next financial crisis.

Reducing debt to prudent levels is important both for governments and households. A fiscal council could help Parliament to hold government to account for the quality of its spending.

Firms and households should avoid borrowing to excess to buy over-priced assets. A narrower and more prudent focus for the Reserve Bank is desirable.

The temptation in the face of such extremes in the major economies is to hope that somehow this global episode will not end in tears โ€“ that โ€œthis time really is differentโ€. That is mere wishful thinking.

Dr Bryce Wilkinson and Leonard Hong of The New Zealand Initiative co-wrote Walking the Path to the Next Global Financial Crisis.

The next financial crisis?

Both the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008 and the Covid-19 pandemic caused disruptions to the world economy.

During the GFC, stock markets plummeted, and millions of people became unemployed. Business and bank failures resulted in financial pain.

Covid-19 did not cause as much economic destruction as experts predicted. So far, at least.

During this recession, bankruptcies declined during the pandemic, while prices of assets such as cryptocurrencies, stocks, and houses reached record levels. The net worth of US households increased by USD$26 trillion in 2020.

These developments are extraordinary and unusual. Usually, recessions mean severe losses rather than wealth gains. Are our current financial circumstances sustainable?

Our new report Walking the path to the next global financial crisis explains how skyrocketing public debt and monetary policy easing threaten global financial stability.

In the wake of the GFC, government bailouts of financial institutions ratcheted up public debt ratios dramatically. That was not reversed before Covid struck.

Governments and central banks in developed economies now face tough choices regarding interest rates and debt.

Raising interest rates or ending quantitative easing could destabilise asset markets and the economy. Governments, meanwhile, struggle to wind down stimulus spending and fear higher interest payments on debt.

By printing money and maintaining low-interest rates, it also fuels consumer price inflation. In New Zealand, consumer price inflation hit 4.9% โ€“ the highest level in over a decade. Inflation in the US and the EU is also approaching 6%.

The authorities are not showing a determination to return settings to more normal levels before the next economic shock occurs. They have led investors to believe that the government will underwrite high asset prices such as cryptocurrencies, stocks and housing.

It is now common to hear terms like โ€œtoo big to failโ€ and โ€œwhatever it takesโ€ in financial market jargon. Such beliefs are dangerous for financial stability.

For the government, it is prudent to repair the roof while the sun is still shining. Financial support packages were necessary during Covid-19. But the government should have a credible plan for reducing net debt to more sustainable levels once the pandemic is over.

The financial well-being of citizens is at greater risk when governments are less financially prudent.

As a small, globally integrated economy, New Zealand cannot prevent the next financial crisis.

We do not know when the next financial crisis will hit. But we can prepare for it when it does.

๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ: ๋ฏธ๋ž˜์˜ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋Œ€์‘ ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ (์›์ œ: Walking the Path to the Next Global Financial Crisis)

๋ธŒ๋ผ์ด์Šค ์œŒํ‚จ์Šจ โˆ™ ํ™๋ ˆ์˜ค ๊ณต์ €

์ถ”์ฒœ์‚ฌ (์•„์„œ ๊ทธ๋ผ์ž„์Šค ๊ต์ˆ˜, ์›ฐ๋งํ„ด ๋น…ํ† ๋ฆฌ์•„๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต)

๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ ์ž„๋ฐ•?

์ด ๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ์˜ ์ œ๋ชฉ์ธ โ€œ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋กœ ๊ฐ€๋Š” ๊ธธ(Walking the Path to the Next Global Financial Crisis)โ€์€ ์–ผ๋งˆ๋‚˜ ๊ฐ€๊นŒ์šด ๋ฏธ๋ž˜์— ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ์ง€์— ๋…ผ๋ž€์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์งˆ๋ฌธ์„ ๋˜์ง„๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ƒ๋‹นํžˆ ๊ทผ๋ฏธ๋ž˜์— ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ด์œ ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๋ณธ๋‹ค.  

์ง€๋‚œ 25๋…„๊ฐ„  ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ๋ฅผ ๋น„๋กฏํ•œ ๋งŽ์€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์€ ์•„์‹œ์•„๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ์™€ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ(GFC)๋ผ๋Š” ๋‘ ๋ฒˆ์˜  ์ „์„ธ๊ณ„์ ์ธ ์œ„๊ธฐ์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฐ›์•„ ์™”๋‹ค. ์ด ๋‘๋ฒˆ์˜ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋Š” ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ์‹ฌ๊ฐํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ฐ›์•„๋“ค์ด์ง€ ์•Š๊ณ  ์ง€์†๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์œผ๋กœ ๋ฌด๋ฆฌํ•œ ํ™•์žฅ์„ ํ•ด์™”๋˜ ๊ฒƒ์ด ๊ทธ ์›์ธ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”๋ฐ, ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์žฌ์ •์ ์ž, ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰์˜ ์•ˆ์ผํ•œ ํ†ตํ™”์ •์ฑ…, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€์˜ ๋ฌด๋ถ„๋ณ„ํ•œ ๋Œ€์ถœ๊ด€ํ–‰์ด ๋งž๋ฌผ๋ ค ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ–ˆ๋‹ค.  

์ฝ”๋กœ๋‚˜19ํŒฌ๋ฐ๋ฏน์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•œ ์œ„๊ธฐ ์ƒํ™ฉ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€์ด ์ทจํ•œ ๊ฒฐ์ •๋“ค์€ ์•ž์„œ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•œ ๋‘ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ•œ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋“ค์„ ๋‹ต์Šตํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฐ๊ตญ ์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ํ™œ๋ฐœํ•œ ๊ฒฝ์ œ ํ™œ๋™๊ณผ ๊ฒฝ๊ธฐ๋ถ€์–‘์„ ์œ„ํ•ด ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ˆ ์Ÿ์•„๋ถ“๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฐํ–‰ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ํ›„์œ ์ฆ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์„ ๋†’์ด๊ณ  ์žˆ๊ณ , ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ ์ž ๋ณด์ „์„ ์œ„ํ•ด ์ž๊ธˆ์„ ๋งˆ๋ จํ•ด์ฃผ์—ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„๊ธฐ๊ด€์€ ๊ทธ๋กœ ์ธํ•œ ์œ ๋™์„ฑ์ด ๋ง‰๋Œ€ํ•œ ํˆฌ๊ธฐ์  ์ž์‚ฐ ๊ตฌ๋งค๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•œ ๋Œ€์ถœ๋กœ ์ด์–ด์ง€๊ฒŒ ๋ฐฉ๊ด€ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. 

๊ธˆ์œต์‹œ์žฅ ๋ฒ„๋ธ”์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๊ธˆ์œต์ •์ฑ…๊ธฐ๊ด€๋“ค์ด ๊ทผ์‹œ์•ˆ์ ์ธ ํ–‰๋™์„ ์ทจํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ ์—ญ์‹œ ๊ณผ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ๋‹ต์Šตํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค๋ฉด, ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ค€๋น„์€ํ–‰(Federal Reserve)์€ 1998๋…„ ์žฅ์™ธํŒŒ์ƒ์ƒํ’ˆ(LTCM: Long Term Capital Management) ์‹œ์žฅ์˜ ๋ถ•๊ดด ์ดํ›„ ๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€์„ ๊ตฌ์ œํ•ด ์ฃผ๋Š” ๊ฒฐ์ •์„ ๋‚ด๋ฆฐ ๋ฐ”์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌํ•œ  ๊ฐœ์ž…์งํ›„, ๋ฏธ๊ตญํšŒ๊ณ„๊ฐ์‚ฌ์›(GAO)๋Š” ๊ทธ ๊ฐ™์€ ๊ตฌ์ œ์— ๋Œ€ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์ด ํ‰๊ฐ€ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. 

… ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ค€๋น„์€ํ–‰์ด ๋Œ€ํ˜•๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€์„ ๋Œ€์‹ ํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฐœ์ž… ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๋ฏฟ์Œ์„ ์คŒ์œผ๋กœ์„œ, ๊ทธ ๊ธฐ๊ด€๋“ค์ด ๋” ๋งŽ์€ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ์ˆ˜ํ•˜๋„๋ก ์žฅ๋ คํ•œ ์…ˆ์ด ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค  … ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ค€๋น„์€ํ–‰์˜ ๊ฐœ์ž…์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์€ โ€œ๋Œ€๋งˆ๋ถˆ์‚ฌ(too big to fail)โ€์˜ ์‹ ์กฐ๊ฐ€ ํ™•๋Œ€ ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์šฐ๋ คํ–ˆ๋‹ค … ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ •๋ถ€์˜ ์•ˆ์ „๋ง์ด ํ™•๋ณด๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ๊ธฐ์—…๋“ค์ด ๋ฏฟ๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค๋ฉด ์ด๋“ค์ด ๋” ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๊ฐ€ ํฐ ์‚ฌ์—…์„ ์ถ”๊ตฌํ•˜๋Š” ํ–‰ํƒœ๋ฅผ ์กฐ์žฅํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค. 

๋ฌด๋ถ„๋ณ„ํ•œ ํ™•์žฅ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์˜ˆ์ธก์€ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ ์ด์ „์— ์ด๋ฏธ ์“ฐ์—ฌ์ง„ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.  ์ •๋ถ€, ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰ ๋ฐ ๋ฏผ๊ฐ„๋ถ€๋ฌธ ๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€์˜ ์ •์ฑ… ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์€ ๋Œ€์ถœ๊ธฐ๊ด€๊ณผ ์ฑ„๋ฌด์ž์˜ ์†ํ•ด ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๋ฅผ ์ค„์ด๋„๋ก ๊ฐœ์ž…ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์— ์ดˆ์ ์„ ๋งž์ถ”์–ด ์™”๋Š”๋ฐ, ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ ์ƒ์Šน์— ์˜ฌ์ธํ•˜๋Š” ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์„ ์œ ๋ฆฌํ•œ ์ž…์žฅ์—, ๋ฐ˜๋Œ€๋กœ ๋ณด๋‹ค ์‹ ์ค‘ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ ‘๊ทผํ•˜๋Š” ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์€ ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌํ•œ ์ž…์žฅ์— ๋†“์ด๊ฒŒ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.  

1984๋…„ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐœํ˜ ์ด์ „ ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ์—์„œ๋„ ์œ ์‚ฌํ•œ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์˜ ์›€์ง์ž„๋“ค์ด ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  1994๋…„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ 2008๋…„๊นŒ์ง€ ์ค‘๋„์ขŒํŒŒ์™€ ์ค‘๋„์šฐํŒŒ ์ •๋ถ€๋“ค์€ ํ›„์†์กฐ์น˜๋กœ 15๋…„ ์—ฐ์† ์žฌ์ •ํ‘์ž๋ฅผ ์‹คํ˜„ํ•œ ๋ฐ” ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰์€ ๋ฌผ๊ฐ€์•ˆ์ • ๋˜๋Š” ์ตœ์†Œํ•œ์˜ ๋‚ฎ์€ ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์„ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋กœ ์‚ผ์•˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์—  ์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ๋ง‰๋Œ€ํ•œ ์žฌ์ • ์ ์ž๋ฅผ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ•œ ํƒ€๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ค๋ฅด๊ฒŒ ์•„์‹œ์•„๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ์™€ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ƒ๋Œ€์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ž˜ ํ•ด๊ฒฐํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์œ„์น˜์— ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค.   

๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต ์œ„๊ธฐ์™€ ์ฝ”๋กœ๋‚˜์œ„๊ธฐ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋Œ€์‘์œผ๋กœ ํ™•์žฅ ์žฌ์ •์ •์ฑ…์„ ์‹คํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๊ณ  ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์กฐ์น˜๋Š” ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€ํ”ผํ•œ ์ธก๋ฉด์ด ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ ์ดํ›„, ์žฌ์ •์ •์ฑ…์€ ์‹ ์ค‘ํ•œ ์ž์„ธ๋ฅผ ๊ฒฌ์ง€ ํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋ฉฐ, ๋˜ ๋งˆ๋•…ํžˆ ๊ทธ๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ํ–ˆ์–ด์•ผ ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๋งŒ, ์•ž์„  ๋‘ ์œ„๊ธฐ์™€ ํ˜„์žฌ์˜ ์ฝ”๋กœ๋‚˜-19 ๋Œ€์‘์€ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ฐจ์ด์ ์ด ์žˆ๋Š”๋ฐ, ๋ฐ”๋กœ ์ฝ”๋กœ๋‚˜ ๋Œ€์‘์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰์˜ ์กฐ์น˜๋Š” ์œ ๋™์„ฑ ๋ฐ ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ์˜ ํฐ ์ƒ์Šน์„ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ–ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์กฐ์น˜๋Š” ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ๋ฅผ ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ์˜ ๋ถ•๊ดด ์œ„ํ—˜์— ๋…ธ์ถœ์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๊ณ  ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ํ–ฅํ›„ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์  ๊ณ ํ†ต์„ ์•ผ๊ธฐํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ง€์†์ด ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ์žฌ์ •์ •์ฑ…๊ณผ ๋ฐ ํ†ตํ™”์ •์ฑ…์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ์— ์ ์‹ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ€ ์ผœ์กŒ๋‹ค. 

์ง€๋‚œ 40๋…„ ๋™์•ˆ ๊ณต๊ณต์ •์ฑ…์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฒฝ์ œํ•™์ž๋“ค์˜ ๊ฐ€๋ฅด์นจ์€ โ€œ์ด๋ฒˆ์—๋„ ๋‹ค๋ฅด์ง€ ์•Š๋‹ค(this time is not different)โ€๋Š” ์ด ๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ์˜ ํ†ต์ฐฐ๋ ฅ์žˆ๋Š” ๋ฉ”์‹œ์ง€์™€๋„ ์ผ๋งฅ์ƒํ†ตํ•˜๋‹ค.

๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ์š”์•ฝ

์ด ๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ๋Š” ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์˜ ์•ˆ์ •์„ฑ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๊ฒฝ๊ณ ํ•˜๊ณ , ์ด์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ทผ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผ ์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค. ํŠนํžˆ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ, ์œ ๋Ÿฝ์—ฐํ•ฉ, ์˜๊ตญ, ์ผ๋ณธ ๋“ฑ์˜ ์„ธ๊ณ„ ์ฃผ์š”๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜ ์ตœ๊ทผ ํ–‰๋ณด๋Š” ๋˜ ํ•œ๋ฒˆ์˜ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ค‘๊ตญ์˜ ๋ถˆํˆฌ๋ช…ํ•œ ๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋ฌธ์ œ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ๋„ ์šฐ๋ ค๊ฐ€ ํฌ๋‹ค.

๊ฐ ๊ตญ์˜ ์ฃผ์š” ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰๋“ค์€ ์ „๋ก€ ์—†๋Š” ์ˆ˜์ค€์œผ๋กœ ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ์ธํ•˜ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ž์‚ฐ์„ ๋งค์ž…ํ•˜๋Š” ์–‘์  ์™„ํ™”๋ฅผ ๋‹จํ–‰ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. 1694๋…„ ์ดํ›„ ์˜๊ตญ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰(Bank of England: BOE)์˜ ์žฌํ• ์ธ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์ง€๊ธˆ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ ๋‚ฎ์•˜๋˜ ์ ์ด ์—†๋‹ค. GDP๋Œ€๋น„ ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€์น˜๋„ ์ „๋ก€์—†์ด ๋†’๋‹ค.

๋Œ€๊ทœ๋ชจ ์ •๋ถ€์žฌ์ •์ ์ž์™€ ๊ทน์‹ฌํ•œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„๊ฐ€ ์ผ์ƒํ™”๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค.  ์žฌ์ •์ ์ž์™€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋Š” ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์˜ˆ๋…„ ์ˆ˜์ค€์œผ๋กœ ์˜ฌ๋ผ๊ฐˆ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ์— ํ›จ์”ฌ ๋” ์‹ฌ๊ฐํ•ด์งˆ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.

์—ญ์‚ฌ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณด๋ฉด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„๋น„์œจ์€ ์ „์Ÿ์„ ์น˜๋ฃฌ๋‹ค๋“ ์ง€ ํ•˜๋Š” ํŠน๋ณ„ํ•œ ํ•„์š”์— ์˜ํ•ด์„œ ๋†’์•„์กŒ์ง€๋งŒ, ํ‰ํ™” ์‹œ์—๋Š” ์ฒœ์ฒœํžˆ ๊ฐ์†Œํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝํ–ฅ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์™”๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ํ‰ํ™” ์‹œ๊ธฐ๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ง€๊ธˆ ํ˜„์žฌ, ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„๋น„์œจ์€ ์ถฉ๊ฒฉ์ ์ธ ์ˆ˜์ค€์ด๋‹ค.

์ฃผ์š” ์„ ์ง„๊ตญ์—์„œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„๋Š” ๊ณต๊ณต๋ถ€๋ฌธ์˜ ์ž์‚ฐ ๊ฐ€์น˜๋ฅผ ๋„˜์–ด์„œ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋“ค ์ •๋ถ€๋“ค์€ ๋‚ฉ์„ธ์ž์ธ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๋“ค์˜ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜๋ฅผ ์ €๋‹น์žก๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‚˜ ๋งˆ์ฐฌ๊ฐ€์ง€์ด๋‹ค.

ํ˜„์žฌ ๊ฐ๊ตญ์˜ ๊ธˆ์œต๋‹น๊ตญ์˜ ๋Œ€์‘์„ ๋ณด๋ฉด 2007๋…„ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ(GFC) ๋‹น์‹œ์˜ ์ด๋ก€์ ์ธ ์ˆ˜์ค€์˜ ๋Œ€์‘๋ณด๋‹ค๋„ ๋” ๊ทน๋‹จ์ ์ด๋‹ค. ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰์€ ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๋Œ€ํญ ์ธํ•˜ํ•˜๊ณ  ์•„์ฃผ ์ด๋ก€์ ์ธ ์ˆ˜์ค€์œผ๋กœ ๋Œ€์ถœ์„ ํ™•๋Œ€ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์‹œ ๋งํ•ด, ์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ๊ทธ๋“ค์˜ ๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ๊ธด๊ธ‰๊ตฌ์ œ๊ธˆ์œต(bail out)์„ ์ œ๊ณตํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์…ˆ์ด๋‹ค.

์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์กฐ์น˜๋Š” ์ผ๊ฒฌ ์ดํ•ด๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ๋ฉด๋„ ์žˆ์œผ๋‚˜, ๋ฏธ๋ž˜์˜ ํฐ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๋ฅผ ์•ผ๊ธฐํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ •์ฑ…๊ฒฐ์ •์ž๋“ค์€ ์‹œ์žฅ์›์น™์„ ๋ฌด์‹œํ•˜๊ณ , ์—ฌ๋ก ์„ ์•…ํ™”์‹œํ‚ค๊ณ , ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„๋น„์œจ ์ฆ๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ๋ถ€์ฑ„์งˆํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹น๊ตญ์—์„œ ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋น„์šฉ์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๊ฒƒ์€ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๋งŒ, ๊ทธ๋“ค์˜ ์ ˆ์‹คํ•œ ๊ณผ์ œ๋Š” ๊ณ ์šฉ๊ณผ ๊ฒฝ์ œํ™œ๋™์˜ ์œ ์ง€์˜€๋‹ค.

Covid-19 ํŒฌ๋ฐ๋ฏน ์ด์ „์—๋„ ์„ธ๊ณ„ ์ฃผ์š”๊ตญ๋“ค์€ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ ์ด์ „ ์ˆ˜์ค€์œผ๋กœ ๊ธˆ์œต์ •์ฑ…์ด ์ •์ƒํ™”๋˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•œ ์ƒํƒœ์˜€๋‹ค. (์˜ˆ์™ธ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ๋Š” ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ ์ด์ „ ์ˆ˜์ค€์œผ๋กœ ์ •์ƒํ™”๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค๊ณ ๋Š” ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ, ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ๋ฅผ ์„ธ๊ณ„ ์ฃผ์š”๊ตญ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์–ด๋ ต๋‹ค). ์ฝ”๋กœ๋‚˜ ํŒฌ๋ฐ๋ฏน์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„๋น„์œจ๊ณผ ์ˆœ ๊ธˆ์œต ๋ถ€์ฑ„(net financial liabilities)๋Š” ์ „๋ก€์—†๋Š” ์ˆ˜์ค€์œผ๋กœ ์ฆ๊ฐ€ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ํ†ฑ๋‹ˆ๋ฐ”ํ€ด ํšจ๊ณผ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ ํ•œ์ชฝ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์œผ๋กœ๋งŒ ์›€์ง์ด๊ฒŒ ๋˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜์˜ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋กœ ์ด๋Œ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์ด ํฌ๋‹ค.

์ธ์œ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚ฎ์ถ˜ ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์—ญํšจ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋‚ณ๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ธ์œ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋‚ฎ์€ ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ๊ธˆ ๊ณผ๋Œ€ํ‰๊ฐ€๋˜๊ณ  ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๊ฐ€ ํฐ ์ž์‚ฐ์„ ๋งค์ž…ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋Œ€์ถœ์„ ๋ฐ›๋„๋ก ๋ถ€์ถ”๊ธด๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๊ฒฐ์ •์€ ์•”์šธํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๋ง์„ ๋งž์ดํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์ด ํฌ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์กฐ์น˜๋“ค์€ ๋˜ํ•œ โ€œ์ข€๋น„ ๊ธฐ์—…(zombie firm)โ€์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์—…๋“ค, ์ฆ‰ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜๋Š” ์—†๊ณ  ๋ถ€์ฑ„๋งŒ ๋งŽ์€ ๊ธฐ์—…๋„ ๊ทผ๊ทผํžˆ ์ƒ๋ช…์„ ์—ฐ์žฅํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด ์ข€๋น„ ๊ธฐ์—…๋“ค์€ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ธฐ์—…๋“ค์ด ๋” ์ž˜ ํ™œ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์ž์›์„ ์ ์œ ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ๋˜ํ•œ ์ •๋ถ€๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ๊ธˆ ๋” ๋งŽ์ด ๋นŒ๋ฆฌ๊ณ , ๋œ ์‹ ์ค‘ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ง€์ถœํ•˜๋„๋ก ์กฐ์žฅํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ๋‹ค ๋ฏธ๋ž˜์— ํฐ ๋น„์šฉ์„ ์น˜๋ฃจ๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค.

์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ตœ๊ทผ์˜ ํ˜„์ƒ๋“ค์€ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์งˆ๋ฌธ์„ ๋‚ณ๋Š”๋‹ค. ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์ด ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ํ•˜๋‹ค๊ฐ€ ์ด ์ง€๊ฒฝ๊นŒ์ง€ ์˜ค๊ฒŒ ๋˜์—ˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€? ์•ž์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€? ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ ์ •๋ถ€์™€ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๋“ค์€ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์ฑ…์ž„ ์žˆ๋Š” ํ–‰๋™์„ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€?

์ฒซ ๋ฒˆ์งธ ์งˆ๋ฌธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฐ„๋‹จ๋ช…๋ฃŒํ•œ ๋Œ€๋‹ต์€ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ์˜ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์ด ์ •๋ถ€, ๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€ ๋ฐ ํˆฌ์ž์ž๋ฅผ ๊ธˆ์œต ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๊ณผ๋„ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ณดํ˜ธํ–ˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ •๋ถ€๋ฅผ ํฌํ•จํ•ด ๋ชจ๋“  ์ด๋“ค์€, ๋‚ฉ์„ธ์ž์ธ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๋“ค์ด ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๊ณ„์•ฝ์‹ฌ์‚ฌ(underwriting)๋ฅผ ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์—ฌ๊ธธ ๋•Œ ๋œ ์ฃผ์˜ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ํ–‰ํƒœ๋Š” ์†Œ์œ„ ๋„๋•์  ํ•ด์ด(moral hazard)๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๋„ ํ•œ๋‹ค.

์ด ๋ฌธ์ œ์˜ ์›์ธ์€ ์• ์ดˆ์— ์„ค๊ณ„๊ฐ€ ์ž˜๋ชป๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค๊ธฐ ๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ์ƒํ™ฉ๋ณ€ํ™”๋กœ ์ธํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค.  ํ‰ํ™” ์‹œ๊ธฐ์˜ ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์€ ๊ณ ์ „์  ๊ธˆ๋ณธ์œ„์ œ๋ฅผ ๊ณ ์ˆ˜ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์—์„œ๋Š” ๋ฏธ๋ฏธํ•œ ์ˆ˜์ค€์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค.  ๋ถˆํ™ฉ ์† ๋ฌผ๊ฐ€์ƒ์Šน ํ˜„์ƒ์ธ ์Šคํƒœ๊ทธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜(stagflation)์€ 1971๋…„ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ด ๊ธˆ๋ณธ์œ„์ œ๋ฅผ ํ์ง€ํ•œ ํ›„ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์„ ์ค„์—ฌ์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ณ ํ†ต์Šค๋Ÿฌ์šด ๋””์Šค์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ๊ณผ์ •์ด ๋’ค๋”ฐ๋ž๋‹ค.

1990๋…„๋Œ€์— ๊ฐ๊ตญ์ •๋ถ€๋“ค์€ 0-2% ๋Œ€์˜ ๋‚ฎ์€ ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์„ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋กœ ํ•˜๋Š” ํ†ตํ™”์ •์ฑ…์— ์ง‘์ค‘ํ–ˆ๊ณ  ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์‹œ๋„๋“ค์€ ๊ฝค ์„ฑ๊ณต์ ์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ์‹œ๊ธฐ์—๋Š” ๋‚ฎ์€ ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜๊ณผ ํ•จ๊ป˜ ์™„๋งŒํ•œ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์„ฑ์žฅ์ด ์ด์–ด์กŒ๋‹ค.

๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ 1990๋…„๋Œ€์— ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ์˜ ์”จ์•—์ด ๋ฟŒ๋ ค์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ •๋ถ€์ •์ฑ…์€ ์ง€๋‚˜์น˜๊ฒŒ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๊ฐ€ ํฐ ๋ถ€๋™์‚ฐ๋‹ด๋ณด๋Œ€์ถœ์„ ์กฐ์žฅํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ํˆฌ์ž์ž๋“ค์€ ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ์ด ํญ๋ฝํ•  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ์—๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ค€๋น„์€ํ–‰์ด ๊ธˆ์œต๊ธฐ๊ด€์„ ์ง€์›ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๊ธฐ๊บผ์ด ๋‚˜์„ ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ชฉ๊ฒฉํ–ˆ๋‹ค.

โ€˜๋Œ€๋งˆ๋ถˆ์‚ฌ(too big to fail)โ€™ ๋ฐ โ€˜๊ทธ๋ฆฐ์ŠคํŽ€ ํ’‹(Greenspan Put)โ€™๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์šฉ์–ด๋“ค์€ ๊ธˆ์œต์—…๊ณ„์˜ ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์ธ ๋ฌธ๋ฒ•์ด ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฑฐ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ •๋ถ€ ํ›„์›๊ธฐ๊ด€์€ ๋ชจ๊ธฐ์ง€ ๊ด€๋ จ ๋ณด์•ˆ์œ„ํ—˜์„ ๊ฐ์ˆ˜ํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์‹ ์šฉํ‰๊ฐ€๊ธฐ๊ด€๋“ค์€ ๋ฆฌ์Šคํฌ๋ฅผ ์ œ๋Œ€๋กœ ํŒŒ์•…ํ•˜๋Š”๋ฐ ์‹คํŒจํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์‹ฌ์ง€์–ด๋Š” ์œ ๋Ÿฝ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰(European Central Bank)์กฐ์ฐจ๋„ ๊ธˆ์œต์‹œ์žฅ์˜ ์ถ”๋ฝ์„ ํ”ผํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฒƒ์„ ๊ฐ์ˆ˜ํ•˜๊ฒ ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์•ฝ์†ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.

๋ฐ˜๋ฉด, ์ผ๋ณธ์€ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ๋กœ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฒช์—ˆ๋‹ค. ์ผ๋ณธ์€ 1970๋…„๋Œ€ ์Šคํƒœ๊ทธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์„ ๊ฒฝํ—˜ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ด๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๋งŒ, ์ผ๋ณธ์€ ๊ธ‰๊ฒฉํ•œ ๋ถ€๋™์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ ์ƒ์Šน์„ 1980๋…„๋Œ€์— ๊ฒช์—ˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ, 1990์ดˆ๋ฐ˜์—๋Š” ์ผ๋ณธ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์นจ์ฒด์™€ ํ•จ๊ป˜ ๋ถ€๋™์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ์ด ํญ๋ฝํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค.

์ผ๋ณธ์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ์žฌ์ •์ ์ž๋ฅผ ๊ฐ์ˆ˜ํ•˜๊ณ ์„œ๋„ ๊ฒฝ์ œํ™œ๋™์„ ํ™œ์„ฑํ™”ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๊ธˆ์œต์ •์ฑ…์„ ํˆ๋‹ค. ์ผ๋ณธ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰(Bank of Japan)์€ ์ ์  ๋” ๊ทน๋‹จ์ ์ธ ํ†ตํ™”์ •์ฑ…์„ ์‹ค์‹œํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฒฝ์ œ์„ฑ์žฅ์€ ์—ฌ์ „ํžˆ โ€‹โ€‹์ทจ์•ฝํ–ˆ๋‹ค.

์ผ๋ณธ์€ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ ์ดํ›„์—๋„ ์ด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ •์ฑ…๊ฒฝ๋กœ๋ฅผ ๊ณ ์ˆ˜ํ•ด์™”์œผ๋ฉฐ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋งŽ์€ ์„ ์ง„๊ตญ๋“ค๋„ ๋™์ผํ•œ ์กฐ์น˜๋ฅผ ๋งŽ์ด ์‹ค์‹œํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€์น˜๊ฐ€ ๋’ท๋ฐ›์นจ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€์ฑ„์˜ ๊ธ‰์ฆ์€ ์ผ์ƒํ™”๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค.

์•ž์„œ ๋งํ•œ ์„ธ๊ฐ€์ง€ ์งˆ๋ฌธ ์ค‘ ๋‘ ๋ฒˆ์งธ ์งˆ๋ฌธ๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จํ•˜์—ฌ์„œ๋Š”, ์•ž์œผ๋กœ ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ, ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜, ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋Ÿ‰ ๋ฐ ์‹ค์—…๊ณผ ๊ด€๋ จํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ต‰์žฅํžˆ ์•ˆ์ข‹์€ ์ผ๋“ค์ด ํŽผ์ณ์งˆ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ์˜ˆ์ƒํ•œ๋‹ค.

์ •๋ถ€์™€ ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰์˜ ๊ทน๋‹จ์ ์ธ ์กฐ์น˜๋“ค์„ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์ •์ƒํ™”ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„ ๊ฒƒ์ธ์ง€ ๋Œ€์ฑ…์ด ์—†๋‹ค. ์ผ๋ณธ์ด ๋จผ์ € ์ด๋Ÿฐ ์ƒํ™ฉ์— ๋น ์กŒ๊ณ  ์Šค์Šค๋กœ ๋น ์ ธ๋‚˜์˜ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์—†์Œ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ์—ˆ๋‹ค.

์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ์žฌ์ •์ ์ž๋ฅผ ์ค„์ผ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์‹ค์—…์ด ์ฆ๊ฐ€ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์„  ๊ฑฑ์ •ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰๋“ค๋„ ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ ์ธ์ƒ์„ ํ•  ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์‹ค์—…์— ๋ฏธ์น  ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์šฐ๋ คํ•œ๋‹ค. ์†Œ์œ„ โ€œ์ข€๋น„ ๊ธฐ์—…โ€ ๋“ค์€ ๋ถ„๋ช…ํžˆ ๋„์‚ฐํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ๋†’์•„์ง€๋ฉด ์žฌ์ •์ ์ž๋„ ์ฆ๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋Š”๋ฐ, ์ด๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ถ€๋„๋กœ ์ด์–ด์งˆ ์šฐ๋ ค๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค.

ํ†ตํ™”์ •์ฑ…์€ ์žฌ์ •์ •์ฑ…๊ณผ ์ ์  ๋” ๋ฐ€์ ‘ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ํ†ตํ™”์ •์ฑ…์˜ ์ •์น˜ํ™”(politicisation)๋Š” ๊ธˆ์œต์‹œ์žฅ์˜ ์•ˆ์ •์„ฑ์„ ํฌ๊ฒŒ ์œ„ํ˜‘ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค๊ธ‰ํ•ด์ง„ ์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰์ด ๋‚ฎ์€ ์ด์ž์œจ๋กœ ๊ทธ๋“ค์˜ ์žฌ์ •์ ์ž ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ํ•ด๊ฒฐํ•˜๊ธฐ ์›ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์œ ๋Ÿฝ โ€‹โ€‹์ค‘์•™์€ํ–‰์˜ ๊ตญ์ฑ„๋งค์ž…์€ ์ƒ๋‹นํ•œ ๊ธฐ๊ฐ„ ๋™์•ˆ ์ดํƒˆ๋ฆฌ์•„์™€ ์ผ๋ถ€ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜ ์ •๋ถ€์žฌ์ •์ ์ž ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ์ดˆ๊ณผํ–ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ํ–‰๋ณด๋Š” ๋ฒ•์ ์œผ๋กœ, ๋„๋•์ ์œผ๋กœ, ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ง€์† ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๋‹ค.

๋˜ ํ•œ๋ฒˆ์˜ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ์‹œ์ž‘๋˜๋ฉด ์ž์‚ฐ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ์ด ํญ๋ฝํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ธˆ์œต๊ณตํ™ฉ์ƒํƒœ๊ฐ€ ์•ผ๊ธฐ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์‹ค์—…๊ณผ ๋Œ€๊ทœ๋ชจํŒŒ์‚ฐ ์‚ฌํƒœ๊ฐ€ ์ด์–ด์งˆ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ๊ทน๋‹จ์ ์ธ ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์— ์ด์–ด ๋””ํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ์ƒํ™ฉ์ด ์˜ค๊ฒŒ๋˜๋ฉด ์€ํ–‰์˜ˆ๊ธˆ๊ณผ ํ˜„๊ธˆ์˜ ๊ฐ€์น˜๊ฐ€ ํŒŒ๊ดด๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋งŽ์€ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ๋ถ€์˜ ์ƒ๋‹น๋ถ€๋ถ„์„ ์žƒ๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.

๋ฏธ๋ž˜์— ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•˜๋ฉด ๋ชจ๋“  ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์€ ์ •๋ถ€์—๊ฒŒ ํŒŒ์‚ฐ๋งŒ์„ ๋ง‰์•„์ฃผ๋„๋ก ๊ฒฝ๊ธฐ๋ถ€์–‘(keep the economy afloat)์„ ํ•˜๋„๋ก ๊ธฐ๋Œ€ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.  ์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ์ •์น˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ์–ด๋ ต์ง€๋งŒ ๊ผญ ํ•„์š”ํ•  ๊ฒฐ๋‹จ์„ ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์–ด๋ ค์›Œ์ง„๋‹ค. ์•„์‰ฝ๊ฒŒ๋„ ์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ๊ทธ๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์—ญ๋Ÿ‰๋„ ์ค„์–ด๋“ค๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค.

๊ทธ๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋ฉด, ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์€ ๋ถˆํ–‰ํ•œ ์ •๊ถŒ์„ ํ‡ด์ง„์‹œํ‚ฌ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์œ ๊ถŒ์ž๋“ค์€ ํฌํ“ฐ๋ฆฌ์ŠคํŠธ ๋˜๋Š” ๋…์žฌ์ฃผ์˜ ์ •๋ถ€๋กœ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์ •๊ถŒ์„ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•  ์ˆ˜๋„ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์‹ค๋ง๊ณผ ๋ถˆ์•ˆ์ด ๋”ฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์˜ˆ์ธก๋ถˆ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜๊ฐ€ ํŽผ์ณ์งˆ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.

์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ์„ ์ง„๊ตญ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์˜ ์ตœ์•…์˜ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค์ด๋‹ค.

์ด๋ณด๋‹ค ๋” ๋‚™๊ด€์ ์ธ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด์ž์œจ๊ณผ ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์ด ๋‚ฎ๊ฒŒ ์œ ์ง€๋˜๋Š” ๋™์•ˆ ๊ฐ•๋ ฅํ•˜๊ณ  ์ง€์†์ ์ธ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์„ฑ์žฅ์ด ํ•„์š”ํ•˜๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ์ง€์ถœ์„ ๋Š˜๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ์žฌ์ •์ ์ž๋ฅผ ์ค„์ด๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ์„ธ์ž… ์ฆ๊ฐ€๋…ธ๋ ฅ์„ ๊ธฐ์šธ์—ฌ์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์•ˆํƒ€๊น๊ฒŒ๋„ ์ด ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋Š” ๋ชจ๋“  ๋ฉด์—์„œ ๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ๋‚™๊ด€์ ์ธ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋Š” ๋‹จ์ˆœํžˆ ํฌ๋ง์‚ฌํ•ญ(wishful thinking)์ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค.

์ด ๋ณด๊ณ ์„œ๋Š” ๋‘ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋ฅผ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š” ์„ ์ง„๊ตญ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋Š” ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ ˆ๋š๊ฑฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋กœ, 1990๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดˆ๋ฐ˜ ์ดํ›„ ์ผ๋ณธ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ƒํ™ฉ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ณด๋ฉด ๋œ๋‹ค. ๊ฒฝ์ œ์นจ์ฒด๊ฐ€ ๊ณ„์†๋˜๊ณ  ์ˆœ๊ณต๊ณต๋ถ€์ฑ„๋น„์œจ์€ GDP์˜ 200%๋ฅผ ๋„˜๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์€ ์ตœ์†Œํ•œ์œผ๋กœ, ์ด์ž์œจ๋„  ๋‚ฎ์€ ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ์œ ์ง€ํ•œ๋‹ค.

์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์ด ๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋œ๋‹ค๋ฉด ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ์˜ฌ๋ ค ์ฑ„๋ฌด์ž์—๊ฒŒ ๋ถ€๋‹ด์„ ์ค„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ๋“  ํ”ผํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋”๋ผ๋„ 1970๋…„๋Œ€์˜ ์Šคํƒœ๊ทธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ์‚ฌํƒœ์™€ ๋น„์Šทํ•œ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๊ฐ€ ์ „๊ฐœ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค.

๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ๊ฐ€ ๊ธ€๋กœ๋ฒŒ ๊ธˆ์œตํญํ’์œผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์Šค์Šค๋กœ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ์ž˜ ๋ณดํ˜ธ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์€ ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ๊ฐ€? ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ๋“ค์€ ์ด์ƒ์ ์ธ ์ƒํ™ฉ์„ ์›ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒ ์ง€๋งŒ, ๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ ๋‚™๊ด€๋ก ์—๋งŒ ์˜์กดํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์•ˆ๋œ๋‹ค. ์•ž์„œ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•œ ์„ธ๊ณ„์ ์ธ ํ๋ฆ„๋Š” ์ „๋ก€๊ฐ€ ์—†์—ˆ๋‹ค.

์†Œ๊ตญ ๊ฒฝ์ œ(small economies)์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์‹ ์ค‘ํ•œ ๋ฐฉ์–ด์กฐ์น˜๊ฐ€ ๊ฑฐ์˜ ์œ ์ผํ•œ ๋Œ€์•ˆ์ด๋‹ค. ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ์ •๋ถ€๋Š” ๋‹ค์Œ ๊ธˆ์œต์œ„๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋‹ฅ์น˜๊ธฐ ์ „์— ๊ตญ์˜๊ธฐ๊ด€(Crown)์˜ ์ˆœ์ž์‚ฐ๊ณผ ๊ณต๊ณต ์ˆœ๋ถ€์ฑ„๋ฅผ ํ•ฉ๋ฆฌ์ ์ธ ์ˆ˜์ค€๊นŒ์ง€ ํšŒ๋ณต์‹œํ‚ฌ ๊ณ„ํš์„ ์„ธ์›Œ์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์กฐ์ง€๋“ค์€ ๊ณ„์†์ ์ธ ์ง€์ถœ์ฆ๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ์–ต์ œํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์˜๋ฏธํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋…๋ฆฝ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์šด์˜๋˜๋Š” ์žฌ์ •์œ„์›ํšŒ๊ฐ€ ์˜ํšŒ์— ๋ณด๊ณ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ๋„์›€์ด ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ์˜ ์™ธํ™˜๋ณด์œ ๊ณ  ์ƒํ™ฉ์ด ๊ฒ€ํ† ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”๋ฐ, ํŠนํžˆ ๊ธˆ ๋ณด์œ ๊ณ ์— ๊ด€ํ•ด ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๊ฒ€ํ† ๊ฐ€ ํ•„์š”ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ค€๋น„์€ํ–‰์€ ๊ธด๊ธ‰๊ตฌ์ œ๊ธˆ์œต์„ ์ •์ƒํ™”ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ธˆ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ์ธ์ƒํ•˜๋Š” ๋ช…ํ™•ํ•œ ๊ณ„ํš์„ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ์–ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค.

๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ ์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ๋œ ์‹ ์ค‘ํ• ์ˆ˜๋ก ๊ฐœ์ธ์ฐจ์›์—์„œ ๋‰ด์งˆ๋žœ๋“œ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ ๊ฐœ๊ฐœ์ธ์€ ๋” ์‹ ์ค‘ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ํ˜„์žฌ์˜ ๊ฐ€๊ฒฉ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ€๋™์‚ฐ์ด๋‚˜ ์ฃผ์‹์„ ๋งค์ˆ˜ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋ฌด๋ฆฌํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋Œ€์ถœ์„ ๊ฐํ–‰ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€  ๊ฐœ์ธ์˜ ๋ฏธ๋ž˜๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ๋Ÿฌ์‹œ์•ˆ๋ฃฐ๋ › ๊ฒŒ์ž„์„ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๊ณผ ๋งˆ์ฐฌ๊ฐ€์ง€๋กœ ์œ„ํ—˜ํ•˜๋‹ค. ํฌํŠธํด๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋ฅผ ๋ถ„์‚ฐํˆฌ์žํ•ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋””ํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜๊ณผ ์ธํ”Œ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•  ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์ด ๋ชจ๋‘ ์กด์žฌํ•œ๋‹ค.

Report: Walking the path to the next global financial crisis

Dr Bryce Wilkinson and Leonard Hong

Foreward by Victoria University Professor Arthur Grimes

New Zealand must prepare for the next global financial crisis

New Zealandโ€™s economy suffered less damage from the pandemic than analysts expected.

But new research warns, however, that just as we are emerging from the COVID-19, a new crisis is already on the horizon.

Walking the path to the next global financial crisis highlights the danger of an economic crash which could see asset prices collapse, businesses fail, and KiwiSaver funds and investment portfolios destroyed. Recent homebuyers may find themselves owing more on their mortgage than their home is worth.

According to the report, governmentsโ€™ and central banksโ€™ responses to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 laid the groundwork for the next financial crisis.

With zero interest rates and money printing, asset prices have soared, consumer prices have risen, and public debt has reached dangerous levels globally.

The worldโ€™s politicians and central bank governors are now struggling to return to more normal policies. The result is an economically perilous future.

Former Reserve Bank of New Zealand chair Arthur Grimes warns in the foreword to the report there may be only a short time before the next financial crisis. โ€œCentral bank actions through the pandemic โ€ฆ have placed New Zealand at greater risk of an asset price collapse with ensuing economic pain; the risk is heightened by the unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies globally,โ€ Grimes writes.

The Government must prepare for the next global financial crisis, even though New Zealand is too small to prevent it. The prudent course is to reduce debt, both public and private.

The Covid-19 financial support package has kept Kiwis off of the dole queue and saved many businesses from bankruptcy. However, the government should promptly repay those debts in order to be prepared for the next financial shock.

Failing to prepare now for the next financial crisis could destroy New Zealandersโ€™ nest eggs and threaten their livelihoods.

Channel Your Dark Side

โ€œHow can I be substantial if I do not cast a shadow? I must have a dark side also if I am to be whole.โ€

โ€• C.G. Jung

We experience emotional turmoil from time to time in our lives. This can include bullying, romantic rejections, or even condescension on the part of other individuals. Since I was a young boy, I have been directly criticized by people on several occasions – “You’re a fat loser”, “Useless dickhead”,There is no way you can succeed in this position“. In response to my writing, I have recently received feedback from some individuals that “This is bullshit.“. To be honest, all these criticisms and disappointments breed resentment and frustration. The cycle feeds on itself and deeply hurts me. There are times when the emotional turmoil and suffering manifest themselves in negative emotional reactions toward others. Sadly, this is the default setting for me, and I need to improve it. Patience and sensitivity have been two of my weaknesses.

Nevertheless, I have found that reading Stoic philosophy calmed my mind and helped me recognise that sometimes these critical comments can be used to fuel positive developments. Every individual has a dark side that we try to repress by claiming that “this is not me”. Yet if that is the case, we are deluding and lying to ourselves. As a matter of fact, we can either channel that energy into productive and constructive activities, or we can allow it to manifest itself into destructive outcomes that negatively impact us and those around us.

In relation to the dark side of human psychology, personal trainer Tim Grover explored the hypothesis in his book, Winning’. He is well known for being one of the best trainers on the planet. He trained world-renowned NBA players including Michael Jordan and Kobe Bryant. Both of these men channeled their energy into their passion for basketball. He asked three questions of those who wish to succeed:

Do you bet on yourself?

When things get tough, do we trust ourselves? Do we rely on the opinions of others or our gut instinct? As a Los Angeles Lakers player without Shaquille O’Neal, Kobe exceeded everyone’s expectations and won titles after titles without him. He retransformed his game.

Michael Jordan exceeded the expectations of the crowd by scoring the highest points average in the league for the Chicago Bulls during the 1990s when he was expected to fail by adding 30 pounds of muscle.

Both went against the grain and followed their instincts.

Do you leverage your dark side?

It is no secret that Kobe Bryant had a dark side. He even coined the nickname for it – “Mamba”.

It enabled him to accomplish all the tasks he had at hand. Michael Jordan used his negative past experiences to outwork and outperform other players. His rejection by his peers and his coaches inspired him to become the best of the best. This resulted in a successful outcome for him.

According to Tim Grover, we are best served by our dark side by remembering all the disappointments we have experienced – those who said ‘no’, those who teased us, those who rejected our applications, and those who said to us, “You’re not good enough.” We should mentally connect with how each of these moments made us feel. If that made you feel “fire and fury” inside, then that is the kind of energy you should direct toward productive pursuits. That is our dark side fuel for growth. Turning anger into focus is our superpower. Rather than using this energy for despair or impulsive pleasure, we re-direct it towards activities that will benefit us long-term.

In my case, it is writing this blog – practicing my writing; reading the authors and intellectuals that I admire; pushing myself harder to build greater understanding in economics; and lifting weights harder at the gym.  

Do you live an unbalanced life?

There are always trade-offs to be made in life. For Grover, winning demands obsession. In order to reach our potential, we must make sacrifices. It is important to avoid socializing too much, not committing to family obligations, hobbies, vacations, or leisure activities. In order to succeed, one must focus on the long term.

It is impossible to have it all. Depending on what we want to prioritize, our decisions are always the lesser of the two evils. Those who seek to have it all will not become true masters of their craft. According to Grover, this will be a difficult choice for most people, but in his opinion, a ‘balanced life with leisure’ does not make sense. It is purely about becoming world-class. Perhaps those who take the decision to become masters are considered obsessive, selfish, and neglectful of others.

However, the results speak for themselves. It pays off to have an obsession with something and strive towards mastery and victory. Tiger Woods, for example, has won 109 PGA Tour events, won 15 major championships, and has been ranked number one for 683 weeks in total. 

Conclusion:

โ€œDecide. Commit. Act. Succeed. Repeat.โ€

โ€• Tim S. Grover

For a life of true fulfilment and long-term satisfaction, we must channel our dark energy. Dark energy can be used either productively or destructively. We use our negative emotions as fuel to achieve success in our craft. If we combine this strategy with Stoicism, rely on our guts, our obsession to win, and make important life trade-offs, we can achieve our goals.

Imagine what it would be like to see yourself in the future and prove everyone wrong. That would provide real satisfaction. 

Honoring the 10-Year Anniversary of Kobe Bryant's Final Championship |  TNTdrama.com
Kobe Bryant with the Lakers

Amateur hour

If you want to know everything about ancient Egypt, read a magazine article about it. If you want to know a little less, read a book. If you want to know nothing, study Egyptology.

It is a paradox, but it is true.

As Einstein once said, โ€œThe more I learn, the less I know.โ€

Or was it Aristotle? Or Churchill? Itโ€™s usually one of the three, and who cares about correct attribution?

But I digress. The problem is not with those people who learn just enough to know they know nothing. The problem is all the others.

These are the people who believe they can land a jumbo jet on an aircraft carrier because they played Microsoft Flight Simulator a few times.

And the millions of sadly ignored All Black coaches who have watched a few tests on TV.

And, not to forget, our team of five million epidemiologists.

We know the issue as the Dunning-Kruger effect. People with low abilities often overestimate their competence. 

Surprisingly, the effect is named after David Dunning and Justin Kruger โ€“ although I am sure Einstein could have said it, too.

Dunning and Kruger also gave us a good explanation for their discovered effect. They claim that people are not just incompetent. But people also lack the ability to process enough information to realise how incompetent they are.

Well, I need to think about that.

Unfortunately, modern culture amplifies the Dunning-Kruger effect. Instead of warning people of their inability, it encourages them to live it.

If you have ever watched casting shows or reality TV, you know what I mean.

There are the would-be entrepreneurs going on The Apprentice who could barely calculate the GST on their products.

There are the singers on Americaโ€™s Got Talent who should not even perform under the shower.

And there are the amateur chefs on Hellโ€™s Kitchen who drive Gordon Ramsay to cascades of expletives.

We can but speculate where this exaggerated belief in oneโ€™s own ability comes from.

Is it the schools where every child is a winner? Where there is no failure but only deferred success?

Is it the helicopter parents who stop their children from ever failing โ€“ and if they do blame the teachers?

Or is it our general norm of non-offensiveness which makes us call every bent spoon a spade?

Honestly, I have no idea. I guess I am going to write a book about it.

3x4 Tips To Deal With The Dunning Kruger Effect
Dunning-Kruger Effect